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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Canadian 
decision-making process and the pressures thrust upon the 
policy-makers in the Canadian government before and during 
the crucial period in September, 1939 when Canada declared 
war on Germany,
The first two chapters of the thesis examine the pol­
itical situation and the pressures exerted upon the Canad­
ian government in the inter-war period, and the government 
response to these insistent demands. This section is de­
signed to construct the political environment, both external 
and internal, upon which the decision to go to war was 
based.
The next chapter deals with the political institutions 
which comprised the Executive, Legislature and Bureaucracy 
as well as their powers and methods of functioning in 1939. 
The major decision-makers and their political platforms and 
interests are discussed within the context of this instit­
utional framework.
Chapter k deals with the decision itself, and is sub­
divided into two major sections. The first of these deals 
with Canada's external relations in the September 1 to 10 
period, and includes discussion on the Canadian responses 
to external stiüiuli in that period, the week of "active
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
neutrality" from September 3 to 10, and the interactions 
between Canada and Great Britain on the diplomatic, mil­
itary-strategic and cultural levels. The second section 
of this chapter is an analysis of the Special Session of 
Parliament; the pro and anti-war arguments, the role of 
the Cabinet in the decision, and the results of the Session 
in regards to national unity and immediate war aims.
The conclusion examines the effects of the declaration 
of war on Canada. A description of the challenges to the 
Federal Government from Quebec and Ontario, the conscription 
crises of 19^2 and 19^^ and Canada's contribution to the 
allied war effort are described in this chapter. The chap­
ter closes with an examination of Canadian-American and 
Anglo-Canadian relations in the war years.
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PREFACE
After this particular topic was suggested by my advisor 
some time ago, initial research immediately showed that 
such a study offered great potential. First of all, this 
was the first major decision made by an independent Can­
adian government for which original documentation is avail­
able in any quantity. Documents from the Public Archives 
for 1939 have emerged from under the thirty year clause 
and have been made available for research purposes.
A second point of interest about this particular 
study is that it has not been adequately researched as 
have the pre-war and wartime periods of Canadian politics 
and international relations. Books on the pre-war period 
discuss the political situation up to the 1939 decision, 
but do not discuss the decision itself. Works on World 
War II start at the 1939 decision to go to war, but do 
not analyse that decision in any depth. My particular 
study is an attempt to bridge this void.
In conclusion, I wish to express appreciation to the 
Canadian Archivist and his Staff for their help in pro­
viding access to the W.L.M.King Papers from the pre-war 
years as well as to related documents. The National 
Library in Ottawa was also of great assistance in allowing 
me the use of their facilities. I thank my advisor Dr.
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w.c. Soderlund for his encouragement and sound critical 
advice so often delivered, but so often needed, and to 
Mr. R.G. Krause and Mr. R.G. Hoskins for their practical 
and valuable assistance which was most gratefully received.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to discuss the Canadian decision to enter 
World War II in some depth, it is first necessary to ex­
amine the background to the decision, both to put this res­
olution in perspective, and in the belief that decisions 
are not made in a vaccum, but are dependent upon past ex­
periences.
I have attempted to make a clear-cut distinction be­
tween the external and Internal components of this environ­
ment under the assumption that external pressures can be 
separated from those of the internal political system and 
may influence government decisions to follow policies that 
might not otherwise have been considered. Foreign policy, 
of course, is not made in a vacuum. What the internal 
political structure might dictate may not be possible due 
to the pressures exerted from outside the system. This con­
cept is perhaps best illustrated by Michael Brecher, whose 
general structural differentiation of variables into ex­
ternal and internal components has been loosely applied in 
the first section of this thesis. The specific variables 
used in the Brecher research model, especially in the ex­
ternal field, apply more closely to a post-war power anal­
ysis with emphasis placed upon bloc interactions and the 
relations between the super-powers, and are therefore not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as relevant to a pre-war situation. Thus, in this decision 
these variables have not been used extensively, although the 
general framework has been used, (Appendix A) Karl Deutsch 
also uses this differentiation between external and internal 
variables in his communications model of foreign policy 
decision-making. (Appendix B)
Chapters one and two discuss the background to the 
decision to enter World War II, with special reference to 
the environment as it affected Canadian decision-makers in 
1939» Chapter one discusses the external situation, focusing 
on Canada's relations with the League of Nations, and var­
ious world powers in the inter-war period. The Chapter cl­
oses with a discussion of the effects upon Canada of the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland.
Chapter two discusses the internal environmental con­
figuration, centering upon the various pressures and structures 
within the political system that affected the decision to 
enter World War II. The political structure includes a 
short discussion of the two political cultures of Canada, 
and the differing attitudes of French and English Canadians 
towards participation in World War II. Earlier problems 
such as the Conscription Crisis of 1917, the Depression, 
the mood of isolation in the pre-war era, and their effects 
upon the decision-makers have been included as important 
factors influencing the decision. Regionalism, Public opin­
ion, the platforms of political parties, as well as influ­
ential interest groups are of great importance in estab­
lishing the political climate of 1939. When both of these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
chapters are taken in conjunction with each other, it can 
be seen that divergencies and pressures exerted from the 
external and internal environment often lead to serious 
problems for the decision-makers.
In Chapter three, the thesis shifts focus and deals 
with the ideals, platforms and roles of the decision-makers 
and how they are shaped and modified by the institutional 
structure. The implication drawn from this combination of 
institutional and personal roles is simply that no matter 
how brilliant, personable or well-intentioned a political 
figure may be, he is only as influential or as powerful as 
the political structure allows him to be.
Several other important points are raised in this 
chapter. Due to the nature of the decision, it can be 
classified as a "crisis decision" according to the criterea 
outlined by Glen D, Paige.^ In Paige's scheme, the Canadian 
decision closely fits the criterea for a "crisis decision", 
in that a decision of this type is one that:
1. Threatens high priority goals of the decisional unit.
2. Restricts the amount of time in which a response could 
be made. and isJ7
3. Unexpected or unanticipated by the members of the dec-
^Characteristies of a "Crisis decision":
1. Occasion for decision- thrust upon their organization 
from outside,
2. Decision-making structure.
3. Internal setting relationships- other organizations 
present which can challenge the legitimacy of the decisions 
taken.
k". External setting relationships- the presence of allies 
and enemies over which the decision-makers cannot exercise 
arbitrary control.
G.D. Paige, "The Korean Decision", in J.N. Rosenau, ed. 
International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The 
Free Press, 19^9), P» 462.
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p
Ision-maklng unit.
Again, the Canadian decision fits this definition, 
except, perhaps for the third criterea since the leaders 
of the Cabinet and External Affairs Department had some 
Idea of German Intent well ahead of the event.
If, however, the Canadian case can be loosely class­
ified as a "crisis" decision, one of Paige's conclusions 
Is readily confirmed by the Canadian decision; that
"The greater the crisis^ the greater the acceptance 
of responsibility for action by the leader and more 
the follower expectation and acceptance of the leader's 
responsibility...The greater the crisis, the greater 
the reliance upon the central themes in previously 
existing information."3
Chapter five analyzes the Immediate decision-making 
period In considerable depth and Is divided Into an Internal 
and an external component. The first section deals with 
the external pressures exerted upon Canada during the period 
from September 1 to 10, 1939, and the responses of Canada 
to external stimuli such as the Russo-German Non-aggression 
Pact, the invasion of Poland, and the British declaration 
of War on September 3, 1939. The effect of the week of 
Canadian "active neutrality" from September 3 to 10, and 
the United States' and German reactions to this neutra]ity 
are discussed in this section, as are Anglo-Canadian inter­
actions in the military and diplomatic areas. One major 
conclusion of this thesis Is that King used neutrality to
p. 462.
3ibld., pp. 469 and 472.
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establish Canadian Independence from Great Britain, as well 
as to use this specific decision as a precedent for future 
Canadian action in foreign affairs, recognized by the world 
as independent deliberations.
The Internal analysis concentrates exclusively upon 
the Special Session of Parliament, and activity In both the 
Cabinet and the House of Commons In this particular period. 
The results of the Special Session; the declaration of war, 
the maintenance of national unity, and the elucidation of 
the Immediate war alms of Canada conclude this section of 
the paper.
Again, in the conclusion, the Internal-external div­
ision Is maintained In outlining the results of the dec­
laration of war. The Internal section deals with the Imm­
ediate challenges from Quebec and Ontario to the King gov­
ernment's handling of the war effort, as well as, the major 
conscription crises of 1942 and 1944.
The external section deals with the overall Canadian 
contribution to the Allied war effort, and focuses on both 
the short-run and the long-run effects of Canadian-American 
and Anglo-Canadian co-operation during the war period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I
The Environment in which the Decision was made:
The External Situation
One Canadian reaction after the close of the First 
World War In 1918 was to retreat Into a posture of non- 
involvement In the affairs of Europe. Sixty thousand 
Canadians had died in the Great War, and it was felt that 
no repetition of this could be allowed In the future. 
Canada had several choices of action in achieving this 
goal. At one extreme was strong support for the league 
of Nations and involvement in Europe to ensure peace for 
all time. The opposite extreme was to remove Canada com­
pletely from European affairs, retreating into Isolation, 
and leaving Europeans to settle their own problems.
Canada followed a policy somewhere in between the 
two alternatives outlined. Canada elucidated a policy 
of limited involvement In European affairs, but short 
of commlting Canada to any definite action or policy in 
concrete terms. Canada signed the Peace Treaty of 1919 
and joined the League of Nations but made it clear to 
Europe that Canada's Involvement in future might only be a 
moral stand on specific issues.i
^J.M. Bliss, ed. Canadian History in Documents (Toronto: 
The Ryerson Press, I96S), pp. 303-^.
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The Canadian delegate to the League (M. Dandurand) 
castigated the United States for not supporting the League 
and made It clear that Canada would not bear the whole 
North American burden herself. He reiterated this stand 
in the now-famous "fire-proof house" speech of 1924 em­
phasizing the continental character and geographical is­
olation of Canada from the problems of an Inflamatory
Europe,2
Canada, quite naturally, saw herself as a nation re* 
moved from any potential enemy. She was bordered by two 
oceans adequately patrolled by the Royal Navy, the North 
Pole, and a friendly United States to the South, Thus, 
the scope of this Dominion's European involvement was to 
help solve problems peacefully so that Canadians would 
never again have to fight In Europe over European problems. 
The first test for this limited involvement policy centered 
around the Chanak crisis of 1922, As Prime Minister King 
described the situation:
"I confess it ^ the official request for aid 
from Britain_7 annoyed me. It Is drafted designedly 
to play the imperial game, to test out centralization 
vs. autonomy as regards to European ware...I have 
thought out my plans...No contingent will go without 
Parliament being summoned in the first instance.,,
I am sure the people of Can-da a^e against part­
icipation in this European war."8
Although the other Dominions promised Britain support,
^Ibid,, pp. 304-4.
^R.C. Brown and E. Prang, ed. Confederation to 1949 
(Scarborough: Prentlce-Hall, 1966), pp. 299-300.
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8Canada firmly refused to send troops in the event of war.
It is true that King's refusal could be construed as an 
effort to assert Canadian autonomy,4 but it is also an 
instance where Canada showed a strong reaction to involvem­
ent in European affairs, as this further statement of 
Mackenzie King illustrates:
"A good deal of tine has been given by Canada to 
the affairs of Europe during recent years. The time 
has come when we are justified in giving attention 
to our own problems, and meddling just as little as 
possible in the affairs of other countries or other 
parts of the British Empire where our interest is not 
immediate and direct."5
Perhaps the classic example of the policy of limited 
involvement is the Riddell Incident of 1935» After the 
Italian invasion of Etheopia, the League voted to apply 
sanctions on certain items being imported by Italy. Can­
ada's delegate, Walter Riddell, tried to put some force 
into the sanctions by initiating a proposal ( without 
Government consentJ to extend the embargo to include coal, 
oil and petroleum. Without these commodities Italy could 
not sustain her military drive into Etheopia and could not 
run industry and transport at home without heavy disruptions. 
There was some question as the time that Riddell had taken 
this stand upon the advice of the British government, whose 
delegates did not want to disrupt the good relations existing 
between Britain and Italy. This rumour, whether true or 
not, did filter back to the Canadian Government, as the
Blair Neatby, Mackenzie King, The Lonely Heights 
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 19o3), p. 38.
^W.L.M.King Papers, "Memoranda & Notes", Vol 60,
pp. c46601-2.
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following telegram from the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to Riddell indicates:
"You must of course realize that you are acting for 
the government of Canada and not for any other govern­
ment, delegation or committee. When you desire in­
structions on any proposal you should communicate 
sufficiently in advance to give time for consideration 
here."&
This was an improper reprimand by the Canadian govern­
ment since no direction had been given Riddell after re­
peated appeals, and the failure in communication should 
more rightly have been placed upon the government, at the 
time in the process of changing leadership after the 1935 
election. The effect of the failure of the government to 
back Riddell was the collapse of any effective League sanc­
tions against Italy. King explained Canada's position on 
January 11, 1936 in answer to one letter from a constituent:
"It ^the Canadian Government^/ is prepared to 
consider, with the other members of the League, any 
proposal made for the extention of such sanctions. It 
does not consider that Canada should take the initiative 
in urging the adoption of sanctions proposals raising 
special questions of co-ordination and enforcement by 
countries other than Canada."7
No other nation was willing to take the initiative in 
this instance, ending the possibility of stopping aggression 
throught this body. In this way, Canadian appeasement 
policies closely paralleled those of Great Britain, with 
emphasis on concilliation to achieve peace and goodwill.
The differences between the two countries came in their
^ W.L.M. King Papers, "Statements & Speeches", 
p. 181187.
?Ibid.. p. 189810.
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approach to the League. Canadian delegates since the early 
1920's h'd exhorted the European nations to live in harmony 
as did the two great nations of North America, a somewhat 
ingenuous and unrealistic, if not to say patronizing, app­
roach to solving the problems of Europe. Perhaps the most 
pertinent and positive suggestions to the League were those 
of Mackenzie Ling, delivered in 1936.
In his speech to the League on Ceptember 29, he re­
iterated the Canadian stand that no nation should be auto­
matically committed to the use of force in foreign relations 
through the League. He emphasized Canada's experiences in 
the League, North America and the Commonwealth as examples 
of "peaceful co-existence". He emphasized the need to have 
all the powers, large and small, as members of the organ­
ization. He did not advocate, as did many members, that 
the League be re-organized to make it work more effectively, 
but that nations abide by and work to fulfil the articles 
of the Covenant. For example, the pledge to reduce armaments 
(Article VIII) had not been lived up to by members. Since 
collective security had never been effective, he advocated 
that regional organizations might better fulfil the security 
function of the League. He also advised that the unanimity 
clause be revised to make this facet of the League's funct­
ioning more workable. Canadian public opinion and the Press 
applauded King for this initiative in international relations,^
®James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: Univ. of 
Toronto Press, 19d7), II, 36-4o.
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However, little concrete came out of these and other pro­
posals, causing King to become disillusioned with the League,
As Professor Eayrs commented on this change of heart;
"Travel can narrow the mind."
Trouble in Europe was not Canada's sole concern between 
the wars, Japan and unrest in the Far East loomed rather 
large during the 1930's as a threat of major importance to 
world peace, Japanese aggression against China, and the 
harassment of Westerners by the Japanese armed forces led 
to a worsening of relations between Japan and the United States 
and Great Britain.
Several incidents involving Canadian citizens occurred 
during the late thirties. Several missionary stations 
clearly marked with Canadian or British flags were attacked 
by Japanese aircraft. In the international settlement of 
Shanghai, Canadians were harassed by Japanese soldiers 
guarding the perimeter of the compound. At times food and 
water supplies were either completely stopped or severely
curtailed.9
In 1936, Canadian defence plans were directed towards 
the Pacific, and the threat of war between Japan and the 
United States, Japan and the British Empire, or Japan 
against both of these powers, as this Canadian Department 
of National Defence Memorandum explains:
"The deterioration in the political situation in 
the Far East, and the distinct possibility of war
^W.L.M.King Papers, "Statements & Speeches", Vol. 2?4,
). 231526.
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breaking out in the area in the not too distant 
future have brought Canada, as a Pacific power, face 
to face with definite local responsibilities con­
cerning defence."10
This 1935 statement continues in stronger, and more 
concrete terms. A fear of Japanese attack was expressed, 
both from air and naval forces, and the possibility of 
Japanese landing parties operating in strength was con­
sidered a strong possibility.
Even if Canada was to remain neutral in a war between 
the United States and Japan, Canadian neutrality would have 
to be protected. Japanese submarines could conceivably 
work in conjunction with surface ships and operate out of 
the excellent harbours along the sparcely populated coast 
of British Columbia to attack shipping along the west coast 
of the United States. If Canada could not police her 
shoreline, the United States could be tempted to move 
troops, aircraft and ships into British Columbia to curtail 
Japanese operations. The report also foresaw the possibility 
of a two-front war.^^
Canadian response to this threat was to build land, sea 
and air forces to the level that one coast could be effect­
ively protected, with base facilities of reasonable size 
on both coasts. Thus, Canada's defence posture in the late 
thirties included a threat from Japan at least equal to that 
from Europe, but in a more indirect way. Canada saw herself
lOfbid.. Vol 221, p. IÜ9803
llfbid.. p. 189810.
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cither in the position of an active neutral in a war be­
tween the United States and Japan, or as a passive be­
lligerent in a war between Japan and the British Empire.
Although Japan played a major part in Canada's defence 
posture, the overriding security problem for Canada between 
the wars centered upon Germany. If any country was feared 
by Canada in the 1930's it was Germany and the fascist 
theories of its government. Between the wars the spectre 
of world-wide fascism was becoming more of a reality. By 
1939, Italy, Germany, many of the Balkan states, Spain,
Japan and Argentina had fascist or pro-German governments. 
Several incidents led factions of Canadian society to 
believe that Nazlisra could spread to North America. Both 
Canada and the United States had sizeable Nazi Parties 
which were under direction from Germany, in one form or 
another. Naziism was viewed as a dynamic force in much the 
same way as a psychological fear of Communism gripped the 
United States and Canada in the 1950's.
The first indicator of Canada's need to be concerned 
with her security, and indeed her status as an independent 
nation came in a book about Canada by a Canadian, Colin 
Ross, Zwischen U.S.A. und dem Pol, (between the U.S.A. and 
the Pole.) which was published in Leipzig in 193k. One of 
the most often quoted sections reflects directly upon the 
future of Canada:
"Canada is one of the very few big free spaces which
l^watson Kirkconnell, Canada, Europe and Hitler (Toronto: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), p. 190.
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are still left on this planet. Who is to take po­
ssession of it? This questions seems to be senseless
at first sight, for Canada is already in someone's
possession. But we have become accustomed to the idea 
that there is nothing stationary, unshakable now; 
neither the inherited habits and forms of government, 
nor in the existing rights of possession."13
The book itself is a travelogue on Canada and New­
foundland, and stresses the natural wealth; minerals, 
forestry and farming, as well as the primitive nature of the 
country with its vast open spaces. The illustrations for 
the most part stress the primitive aspects of Canada, with
the pictures showing trappers, Eskimos, Indians and poor
fishermen. The strong pond between Canada and Germany is 
stressed in one chapter examining the German settlements 
in the Prairie Provinces.
Whether or not this book did contain Machiavellian 
intentions, in prominent anti-Nazi circles the work was 
taken to be an invitation to the German government to 
attack Canada.
The first direct threat to Canadian sovereignty came 
in a series of incidents centered around Anticosti Island, 
a strategic island dominating the mouth of the ft. Lawrence 
River. In 1935 the zeppelin "Hindenberg" diverged from its 
scheduled route from Hamburg to New York to fly up the St. 
Lawrence very slowly and at a low altitude, allegedly for 
the purpose of taking pictures of Anticosti I s l a n d . I n
13colin Ross, Zwischen U.S.A. und dem Pol (Leipzig; 
Fu. Brodhaus, 1934), p. 1.
l4"Hitler over Canada", Now Pub. Assoc., Vol. I,
No. 1, (1939); p. 3.
l^ibid., p. l4.
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1936 a group of "Dutch forestry experts" arrived on the is­
land, where they took soundings of the harbours and an 
extensive aerial survey of the island. These men were 
later identified as German, not Dutch, and were not foresters, 
but experts in military construction as the following 
quote explains:
"Mysterious groups of German 'lumber experts' 
repeatedly visited Canada to investigate lumber con­
ditions. These visitors numbered among them military 
men, cartographers, aviation experts and other pro­
fessionals who have more to do with building naval bases
than lumber."18
Shortly after, a German firm applied for the forestry 
rights to Anticosti Island for lumbering purposes. There 
was some fear at the time of German airfields or submarine 
bases being built in secret if these rights were granted.
Under pressure, the Canadian Government delayed its decision 
on the matter. Thereupon, a letter arrived from Reich 
Marshal Goring explaining German purposes for this project, 
and reassuring King that nothing clandestine was being 
planned. (See Appendix C) King's reply was typically non- 
commital:
"The whole question has however come under the con­
sideration of our government as a result of develop­
ments in other sections of Canada, and I regret there­
fore, that it would not be possible under these cir­
cumstances to state that no restrictions or embargo 
on such exports would be established in the f u t u r e . "17
In the meantime, Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis had
l^lbld., pp. l4-5.
l?W.L.M.King Papers, Vol 250, p. 213713
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legislation passed respecting the shipping of wood to 
places outside the Province of Quebec. In future, the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council would have to issue an annual 
permit for the export of forest products, (subject to 
inspection) effectively diminishing German interest in the 
project.
Reaction in the House of Commons assumed a threat from 
Germany in this series of moves;
"The visit of German engineers to Anticosti Island, 
last December was prompted by the desire to secure raw 
materials or to establish a military base, and one is 
as alarming as the other."18
Coupled with this threat was a fear of air attack from 
Germany. The United States Department of Defence expressed 
this fear in 1935, and Canada's Defence Department reasoned 
that if the United States was threatened, then Canada was 
even more vunerable in the case of attacks by either Ger­
many or J a p a n .
Other events led to the straining of German-Canadian 
relations. German diplomatic communiques protesting anti- 
German policies and statements became rather voluminous 
as war approached. Perhaps the most sensitive area of con­
tention was to do with trade policies and the German sen­
sitivity to the boycott. In 1933 a near calamity arose 
in Germany, "due to a boycott of German goods in return 
for German reprisals against the J e w s . "20
l^Canada, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), (1 April, 1938), p. l656,
19Klng Papers, Vol. 221, pp. 189793-817.
20c,G. Haines, and J.M.S. Hoffman, The Origins of the 
Second World War (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1943), p. 3+9.
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In September 1938 the "Trades and Labour Congress of
Canada" passed a resolution to advocate the boycott of
German goods. The German reply was swift, curt, and gave
some indication of a threat to Canada if the boycott was 
21not curtailled. Other correspondence on the diplomatic 
level, especially in early 1939, bordered on the ludicrous. 
Objections to propaganda movies "Confessions of a Nazi Spy" 
and "I was a Captive in Nazi G e r m a n y " ,22 articles in mag­
azines, "Dastardly Hitler" and "Hitler is a Pansy" hardly 
apnear worthy of diplomatic correspondence, but are ill­
ustrative of the strained relations between the two countries, 
Correspondence of a more serious nature included 
reference to officials in government making insulting 
speeches about the Nazi Regime. One of these objected to 
strenuously was that of Dr. Manion (Leader of the Opposition) 
who described Hitler as a "madman".23 These complaints 
are followed by hints of reprisal in the German press.
21E. Windels (German Consul General) to W.L.M. King;
"I therefore have the honour to ask the Canadian gov­
ernment whether it would not be feasible to enlighten the 
respective Labour organizations on the harmful effects of 
their propaganda for Canada as well as for Germany, and to 
use its influence with a view to having the boycott against 
German goods in Canada brought to a speedy end."
King Papers, Vol. 250, pp. 213847-48.
22%bid.. July 18, 1939, Vol. 282, p. 238404.
23"Here we are faced with the aspect of two madmen, 
Mussolini and Hitler, threatening the peace of the world... 
We are opposed to international gangsterism that has been 
manifested in the rape of Abyssinia, China, Czecho-Slovakia 
and recently Albania."
Ibid.. April 21, 1939, p. 238498.
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The Canadian Government's continuing reply was to reiterate 
the freedom of speech and of the Press enjoyed by Canadians, 
and that nothing could be done to restrict these basic 
rights. Certainly these exchanges did not help relations 
between the two countries.
As stated earlier, the spectre of an alliance of Japan, 
Germany and the U.8.8.R. was indicated in the defence con­
tingencies of 193&* In light of this, it is curious that 
no real attempts were made to cultivate closer relations 
with the Soviet Union as the key to this threatening all­
iance.
In most of the correspondence from the pre-war era 
between the U.8.8.R. and Canada, the Soviets take the 
initiative and push for more normalized relations between 
the two nations. Canada desired less trade barriers be­
tween the two countries, while the Soviet Union wanted 
consular representation, or at least an exchange of trade 
missions of substantial size. It was Canada that rejected 
these formal overtures to normalize relations. The majority 
of these discussions took place as late as 1936 between 
the Canadian High Commissioner in Great Britain, Vincent 
Massey, and the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Windels to O.D. Skelton:
"8uch sordid personal insults...by their constant re­
petition must have a poisoning effect upon the broad state 
of the population and finally constitute a serious danger 
to international relations." (Also s^e Appendix D)
Ibid., February 1, 1939, p. 2384U9*
Z^ibid., June 10, 1936, pp. 191871-2.
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It was only after the German attack upon the Soviet Union 
that diplomatic missions were exchanged. The fear of comm­
unism on the domestic scene, especially in Quebec and among 
Ukrainian and White Russian immigrants was a factor that 
precluded close relations between the two countries,
Soviet friendship was not considered valuable or even 
necessary in Canada until after the outbreak of war. In 
1939 the prime emphasis in Canadian policy centered upon 
the unity of the English-speaking world as a power bloc 
to counter the anti-commintern group (Italy, Germany and 
Japan) and the Commintern bloc. The underlying assumption 
seemed to be that the Commintern and Anti-commintern blocs 
would fight, and the victor would then threaten the English 
speaking group. Thus, the solidarity of Britain, the Comm­
onwealth and Empire and the United States was all i m p o r t a n t .^6 
This theory became even more important after the Soviet- 
German non-aggression pact of 1939.
In the inter-war period, Canada's relations with Great 
Britain centered upon the drive for independent status in 
the eyes of the British government, as well as the rest of 
the world.
The first manifestation of this move came in 1919 when 
Canada became a signatory of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, and signed the Treaty of Versailles independently 
of Great Britain. From this time onwards Canada was to lead 
the Dominions in asserting their rights as independent 
entities with Mackenzie King in the forefront of this
26lbid., March 9, 1939, pp. 229408-11.
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evolution towards full sovereignty,
"Under' King, Canada was not only to obtain greater 
freedom of action, but was to win for herself complete 
autonomy in all matters relating to foreign policy 
and international relations,"2?
The first test of King's resolve came in 1922 when 
the Chanak crisis appeared to be developing into an Anglo- 
Turkish war, Britain asked the Dominions for support in 
the event of hostilities and was immediately supported by 
Australia and New Zealand.
Canada's reticence to commit forces was indicated in 
the form of a qualified refusal, Canada might send troops, 
but not as an automatic response to a British request. The 
reply was based on the view that the executive committee of 
the Canadian Parliament would do the bidding of the people 
of Canada through their appointed representatives; It was 
not an autocratic body to impose its will on Parliament, 
Canada's Parliament was to be the supreme body in deciding 
upon Canada's participation in foreign w a r s .28
In 1923, this stand was again upheld with the addition 
of a theory that described the relationship between the 
Dominions and the Mother country as somewhat similar to 
that of sovereign entities or a League of Nations. Foreign 
policy should be decided by discussion and concensus, but 
where the Dominions differ, that policy should not be 
binding.29
27h .R.Hardy, Mackenzie King: of Canada (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1949),p, 1,
2^King Papers, "Memoranda & Notes", Vol. 60, p. C46799*
29ibid.. p, C46607
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This doctrine was fine in principle, but only evolved 
slowly in practice with the British Government trying to 
maintain the status quo, or attempting to take Dominion 
support for granted, with the Dominion ministers fighting 
to maintain an independent status, as in the case of Lausanne;
"Lausanne was only one of many issues in 1924 where 
British governments either ignored or misinterpreted 
the Canadian position in foreign affairs. He King_/ 
insisted on the orinciple of Canadian autonomy on 
each occasion."30
The culmination of this movement came in 1931 with the 
Statute of Westminister giving the Dominions formal inde­
pendence; A following up of the 1926 Imperial Conference 
at which the Dominions were granted almost total autonomy. 
However, the Statute of Westminister lacked precision as 
to whether a Dominion could remain neutral in the case of 
an imperial war. The King could not be at war in one 
capacity, (King of Great Britain) and at peace in another, 
(King of Canada) or so it was argued, until the Canadian 
Parliament passed a Seals Act in 1939 declaring autonomy 
of action in time of war between Great Britain and any other 
power.31
Even then there was some question as to Canada's 
status in the case of an Empire war. Some doubtful areas 
existed which clouded the Canadian assertion of independent 
status. For example, it was a problem trying to maintain 
independence and neutral status with diplomatic functions 
often in the hands of the United Kingdom Foreign Service.
30h ,Blair Neatby, op. cit., p. 3&.
33b . Hutchinson, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto; 
Longman's Green & Co., 19^2), p . 242
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There were two other areas which tended to obscure 
the issues. Canada's sentimental and traditional tie to 
Great Britain and the strong vocal support of Britain by- 
national and regional groups in Canada led to some mis­
understanding as to the Dominion's status both overseas 
and in the United Kingdom, (Appendix E) If Britain were 
attacked, it was felt that Canada would not hesitate in 
her support of the Mother country out of a sentimental 
attachment, especially strong among the English-speaking 
Canadians.
"If,' King said, 'there were a prospect of an 
aggressor launching an attack on Britain, with bombers 
raining death on London, I have no doubt what the 
decision of the Canadian people and Parliament would 
be. We would regard it as an act of aggression, 
menacing freedom in all parts of the British Common­
wealth. "32
Even in this extreme case, however, a decision to help 
Britain would not be automatic, but would be made by the 
Canadian people and the Canadian Parliament, although there 
was little doubt as to what that decision would be.
The second nebulous area was that of military co­
operation and the standardization of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth Armed Forces. Military co-operation and 
standardization throughout the Empire implied that the 
Canadian Armed Forces were adjuncts of the British service. 
Uniforms, equipment, training, armaments, insignia (both 
of rank and nationality) and even Regimental names and 
marches were those of British units.
32ibid.
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The problem of Empire defence planning also became 
apparent if Canada was to take an independent stand in 
defence affairs. Ceveral incidents arose where Canada 
had to decide between independence and close co-operation 
with Great Britain. In 1935, requests to train pilots for 
the R.A.F. in Canada were greeted with caution by Mackenzie 
King. The training plan that King envisioned was on a 
small scale, with Canadian control over the operation of 
the plan. The government would be glad to provide training 
grounds and equipment in Canada under Canadian or British 
instructors, but under the control of the Canadian minister 
of National Defence,33
The British proposal envisioned a huge training system 
far beyond the means of the Canadian government both in the 
financial burden, administration and facilities, Britain 
offered a large number of planes as gifts or on loan to 
Canada for this plan. Ian Mackenzie refused this offer on 
grounds of threatened sovereignty;
"If we accept a gift or loan from the United Kingdom 
government, will the Canadian government be justified 
in maintaining that Parliament will remain free to 
decide on the nature and extent of our actions in the 
event of war,"34
The Air Training Plan concept gained no headway until 
after war was declared in 1939*
At the same time, military co-operation was close in
33icing Papers, "Statements & Speeches", Vol. 2^2, 
p. 216243.
3^Ibid., Vol. 252, p. 216247.
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other areas. In Inte August 1939, when Canada should have 
been making every effort to remain neutral in the eyes of 
the world, close co-operation was evident between Canada 
and Great Britain. The Canadian government allowed the 
cruisers H.M.S. Berwick and H.M.b. York to be based on 
Halifax.
In the same series of dispatches, the British recomm­
ended certain types of reconnaissance aircraft and inquired 
as to whether the Dartmouth Naval Air Station was equipped 
to handle these planes. Inquiries were also sent to as­
certain whether Canada had sufficient aircraft at Halifax 
for reconnaissance duties, and whether the same duties 
could be carried out by the R.C.A.F. in the West I n d i e s , 35 
At the same time, the Canadian government requested bases 
in Newfoundland for reconnaissance flying boats. This inter­
action could certainly be construed as a unified effort to 
defend the Western coast of the Atlantic from future enemy 
actions under the assumption that both nations would co­
operate in this endeavour. This was by no means a policy 
of the Defence Department taken in haste with the imminent 
threat of hostilities threatening Canada directly. It was 
the culmination of careful planning implicit in the theor­
etical base of the Imperial defence philosophy.
The Canadian Department of National Defence emphasized 
this philosophy in 1936 as a series of principles. These
35lbid., Vol. 272, pp. 230441-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
somewhat contradictory statements emphasized the political 
independence of the sovereign units, but the necessity 
for defence co-ordination in time of war committing the 
Empire and Commonwealth to a common military plan.^^ln 
this respect, the traditionally minded Armed Forces staff 
agreed with the British concepts and worked towards them 
perhaps at odds with the government. However, more will 
be said about this in Chapter two.
With the fear of war in the middle and late 1930*s 
from both Europe and Japan, Canada's relations with the 
United States assumed great importance. In terms of Anglo- 
Canadian relations, the U.S. insistence upon the immutability 
of its neutrality caused Canada to become more of a force 
in British thinking.
In acquiring munitions, the United States Neutrality 
Law was stressed over and over again. No military supplies 
could be shipped to belligerents from the United States in 
the event of war. Thus, Canada assumed greater importance
36%st. Each self-governing portion of the Empire is 
primarily responsible for its own local defence.
2nd, The Security of the Empire is a matter of con­
cern to all its governments.
3rd. The military action taken at any time, peace 
or war, is a matter for individual decision on the part of 
each Empire government.
4th. in order to permit effective military co-op­
eration between the different portions of the Empire... 
the following measures are recognized as being of major 
importance:
(a) Adequate means for the maintenance of Empire 
communication.
(b) Similarity in training, equipment and organization 
of the several armed forces of the Empire."
Ibid., Vol. 221, p. 189986.
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to the Empire as a close, somewhat industrialized power 
to supply some of Britains needs in time of w a r . 37
The Canadian proximity to the United States also 
added a measure of independence to Canada:
"One of the cardinal assumptions of any rational 
Canadian defence policy is that armed conflict with 
the U.S. would put the Dominion in an untenable de­
fence position. It follows that Canadian adherence 
to imperial foreign policy can never be unqualified 
whenever that policy impinges on the interests of 
the United States,"38
Thus, through geographical propinquity, Canada co­
operated closely with the United States in the pre-war 
years. By 1936 close relations were being fostered on both 
sides of the border. The United States feared a conflict 
of interests with Japan in the North Pacific and desired 
closer communications with Alaska, Negotiations regulating 
military aircraft in overflights from the United States to 
Alaska began as well as discussions on the building of the 
Alaska Highway, Some co-operation as a belligerent or an 
active neutral would have been inevitable if Japan were to 
go to war with the United States,39
The United States also looked upon the North American 
continent as a unit which would have to be defended jointly 
in case of overseas aggression. President Roosevelt stated 
this policy in his now-famous speech at the opening of the 
Ivylea Bridge:
3?Ibid.. pp. 203742-6.
38"The Dominions and Imperial Defence", Round Table, 
Vol. 27 (April, 1937), p. 555.
39King Papers, Vol. 221, p. 234037.
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"I give to you assurance that the people of the 
United States will not stand idly by if domination 
of Canadian soil is threatened by any other e m p i r e , "  iO
At this juncture some form of North American solidarity
was apparent, and has been documented in statements by
politicians on the Northern side of the border. T.A. Crerar,
before leaving to represent Canada at the 1937 Imperial
Conference in London stated to the press;
"The conference will be interesting, and probably 
in some ways revealing; but the more I see of the whole 
thing, the more I am certain that our destiny is on 
the North American continent and that if Europe is 
going to insist on destroying itself, it is no part 
of our mission to destroy ourselves in attempting to 
prevent it,"41
In this way, the policies of isolation in the United 
States and Canada closely resemble each other; Both nations 
desiring to remain aloof from European affairs. Canada 
differed in her strong traditional ties with Great Britain, 
but these were somewhat modified by the proximity to the 
United States and the distance between North America and the 
trouble spots of Europe, A detachment, linked with a 
strong moralistic approach characterized the relations 
of both nations towards Europe in the 1930's.
This detachment is epitomized by the Canadian reaction 
to the German re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. An 
editorial in the Vancouver Bun commented:
"Canada is only a spectator. There are not enough
^Olbid,, Vol. p. 234037.
4lH.L. Keenleyside, The Growth of Canadian Policies 
in External Affairs (Durham N.C.; Duke Univ. Press, I960), 
p. 6 .^
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moral principles at stake to induce her to become 
otherwise,,.Whatever morality lies in the scales 
seems to be, this time, on Germany's side of the
balance."^2
This moral approach was characterized in the early 
part of 1937 by the whirlwind tour of Mackenzie King 
through Europe. His speeches at the League of Nations and 
the Imperial Conference were later supported by his personal 
interview with Hitler, where he became even more convinced 
that the German Chancellor was a peaceloving, dedicated 
and rational leader who would not plunge Europe and the 
world into open conflict.^3 This meeting with Hitler con­
firmed King's policy of peaceful negotiation and dialogue 
in the belief that it would keep peace in Europe. This
policy was explicated once again by Ernest Lapointe in
May, 1938:
"What is the foreign policy of Canada? The foreign
policy of Canada is to keep Canada out of the war; to
try to keep Canada at peace; to be peaceful with all 
the countries of the world; to have those family 
relations.,.with other members of the C o m m o n w e a l t h ."44
This policy was to continue through the worst crises
in Europe almost up to the outbreak of war. The Munich
crisis of September 1938 and Chamberlain's policy of
appeasement was seen by King as a great step towards closer
42ibid.. p. 70.
^3Memorandum by King, Berlin, June 29, 1937, in 
King Papers
44^.A. Riddell, ed. Documents on Canadian Foreign 
Policy (Toronto; Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p.203,
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European co-operation and away from war.^^ Again, this 
stand was taken in the belief that Hitler and the Nazi 
Regime were reasonable and of peaceful intent. It was 
only with the German invasion of what was left of Czecho­
slovakia and the mobilization of forces along the Polish 
border that King realised that he had been deceived, and 
turned actively against Hitler.
45W.L.M. King to Neville Chamberlain:
"The heart of Canada is rejoicing tonight at the succès: 
which crowned your unremitting efforts for peace...On the 
very brink of chaos, with passions flnming and armies 
marching, the voice of reason has found a way out of the 
conflict which no people in their hearts desired but none 
seemed able to overt. A turning point in the world's 
history has been reached if, as we hope, tonight's agreement 
means a halt to the mad race in arms and a new start in 
building a partnership of all peoples."4
N. Mansergh, ed. Documents and Cpeeches on British 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-b2 (London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1953), I,"409.
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CHAPTER 2
The Environment In which the Decision was made;
The Internal Situation
On April 1, 1938, in the House of Commons, Mackenzie 
King clarified the relationship between the external sit­
uation and the internal policies of Canada in the form­
ulation of foreign policy. His comments were as follows;
"The foreign policy of Canada is based on three 
essentials, which are relatively simple and easy to 
summarize. They are first, the assertion of a dist­
inct political status in international affairs; sec­
ondly protection from overseas powers; and thirdly 
economic consiaerations,,.The first guiding principle 
in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy should 
be the maintenance of the unity of Canada as a
nation."3
This theme of national unity became the governing 
force of Canada's response to British appeals for support 
in Imperial adventure. The tneme of national unity became 
the most important internal factor to be considered in 
pre-war years in regards to tne cleavage between the dom­
inant political cultures. King considered this point crucial 
as the following statement indicates; "My duty, as I see 
it, is to seek above all else to preserve national unity; 
for on the maintenance of national unity all else d e p e n d s ,"2
3Debates, House of Commons, Canada, April 1, 1938, p. 1926.
^W.L.M. King, "Aggression in Hitler's Mind has no limits" 
Speech to the Winnipeg Board of Trade, July 10, 19^1, pp. 7-8.
10
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This split within the Canadian political, social and 
cultural system was always present just below the surface, 
becoming crucially important during times of intensified 
emotional stress. The cases Illustrating this phenomenon 
that immediately come to mind are those of the North-West 
Rebellion (1885) with the subsequent hanging of the French- 
Canadian patriot, Louis Riel, and the conscription crisis 
of World War I.
With this troublesome political background in mind, 
Mackenzie King tried in the inter-war years to de-emphasize 
the split between the two cultures. He realized that 
English Canada would be more than ready to respond to any 
British appeal for help, but also that Quebec would violently 
oppose any move that could lead to conscription as Québécois 
saw such policy as a move by the English-Canadians to 
dominate their race. This feeling was dormant until 1938 
when the impending war conjured up images of a crisis such 
as that of World War I.
King's approach was to keep Canada as uncommited as 
possible in reference to British appeals, and to repeat 
that conscription would not be imposed upon Canada. Es­
pecially after the Munich crisis, when it seemed as if 
Canada would be drawn into war. King set about uniting the 
nation,
"He was groping for a common ground between the 
two Canadian races. He was educating each in the 
opinions of the other. He was trying to convince 
Quebec, on the one hand, that war could not exempt 
Canada, and the English-speaking Canadians on the
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other, that Quebec could not bo coerced without 
smashing the nation and its chance for victory."3
This polarization occurred with both cultures fighting
strongly for their own position after pro-war statements
by King, Lapointe and M a n i o n . 4  in Quebec, Premier Duplessis
espoused an anti-conscriptionist campaign, and the vocal
mayor of Montreal, Camille Houde, stated in February, 1939
that French-Canadian sympathies lay with Italy,5
The reaction of Quebec youth to these strong pro-war
sentiments of King and Manion was immediate and strong.
Both in Quebec City and Montreal, bands of French-Canadian
youths staged demonstrations of protest, shouting, "No
foreign wars", and "Down with Conscription",^ as a prelude
to what could occur if Canada did go to war, and institute
conscription. Again, Mayor Houde promised to personally
lead any anti-conscription movement in the Province.
For the people of Ontario, Premier "Mitch" Hepburn
espoused a policy of loyalty and support for Britain in
case of war. This policy did not fall short of declaring
a necessity for conscription (Appendix F) which would be
forced upon Quebec as well as the rest of Canada, with the
accompanying fear in French Canada that this would be a
^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 2b-3.
^Canada, House of Commons, Debate, March 30-1, 1939, 
pp. 2409-71.
^King Papers, p. 23023I.
^"Canada and the War Danger".Round Table. Vol. 29 
(June, 1939), pp. 575-6.
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scheme of the English to dominate their race. This may 
certainly have been a reason for this statement being made 
before there was any real need to bring up this question 
for Canada was not at war at the time that this statement 
was made.
King tried to take a middle course in an attempt to 
unite all Canadians behind his government in case of war.
This tendency often led to a strong pro-French Canadian 
stance, as much of King's electoral strength lay in his 
large following in Quebec, Writers, however, tend to stress 
the idealistic nature of King's motivations as is apparent 
in the following analysis;
"He was convinced that the only basis for united 
public support of the war effort was a compromise in 
which, provided that there was no compulsary military 
service outside Canada, the minority, which did not 
believe that the war was Canada's war, would accept 
the will of the majority."?
The policy of King to moderate between the two groups 
fell far short of uniting the nation behind his government, 
French-Canadians, quite flatly, were suspicious of King's 
promises of no conscription, and that Canada would not be 
automatically committed to war if Britain was obliged to 
take such a course. The French-Canadian press placed little 
faith in King's promises. (Appendix G) The spectre of another 
world war fought in Europe with terrible casualties and 
the accompanying necessity for conscription caused the
7j.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record (Toronto: 
Univ. of Toronto Press, i960), I, 23.
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French-Canadian press to push for a policy of purely terr­
itorial defence, and benevolent neutrality towards Great 
Britain. L'Action Catholique, a Quebec City paper, took a 
strong stand against participation, indicative of the French- 
Canadian Press, which argued roughly as follows:
"Canada ought to abstain from participation as 
long as the United States abstains; If, following 
the example of the United States, Canada should decide, 
after a referendum, to espouse the Anglo-Franco-Polish 
cause, our participation ought to be proportionate to 
our means and limited to voluntary service...We ought 
to remain neutral because we are first of all Can­
adians. "8
The Montreal based paper Le Devoir augumented these 
statements with this presentation:
"The avowed motives of humanity, civilization, 
liberty and Christianity which have been put foreward, 
are not the real war aims...The real causes being the 
interests of Great Britain, we ought not to participate 
in the war."9
Although the above statements are indicative of the 
type of elite protest to be found in Quebec in 1939, it 
would be dangerous to assume that they represented even a 
small majority of French-Canadians,
It is a fair assumption that most French-Canadians 
were opposed to conscription.30 However, after the Liberal
^King Papers, Vol. 270, p. 229124.
9ibld.
lOpesults of the Plebisite over Conscription: 
Province Percent Numbers
For conscription Yes No
Maritimes 77______________239,192_______ 77.420
Quebec 28 372.094 942.130
Ontario 84 1,189 ,580 228,351
Prairies 76 563,436 181,569
B.C. 247,687 62,642
Total &+ 2,613,265 1,486,771
"Toronto Daily Star" (April 28, 1942), p.l.
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government's promise of no conscription supported by Mr.
King, Ernest Lapointe and C.G. Power, in early 1939, it, was
less clear how French-Canadians would react to a declarat­
ion of war.
One author writing shortly after the end of the Sec­
ond World War states that, for the most part, French-Can­
adians entered the war, reluctantly, but because the majority 
of Canadians did support participation and they accepted 
the will of the majority. Furthermore, they believed that 
the moral principles that they were being asked to fight 
for were "just and sound".33
Thus, this potentially explosive situation was, to a 
great extent, glossed over without the fear of a split
between the races parallel to that of 1917.
The conscription crisis of 1917 arose during the 
climax of the Ontario School's Question, in which the 
teaching of the French language was to be limited in Ont­
ario schools. The question exacerbated the already tense 
relationship between Quebec and Ontario, with the Canadien 
decrying attempts to stifle French outside the Province of 
Quebec. That great French-Canadian nationalist, Henri 
Bourassa, stressed the importance of the question as well 
as its significance in relation to Canada's war effort, 
as this quote illustrates:
"The whole problem of the French language and of 
French survival is being raised in Ontario,..The
33nardy, op. cit., p. 200.
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enemies of the I'rench language, of French civilization 
in Canada are not the Doches on the shores of the fipree; 
but the English-Can-idian anglicizers, the Orange in­
triguers, or Irish priests."12
Partly through these statements by French-Canadian 
leaders, such as Bourassa, French-Canadian enlistment in 
the Armed Forces lessened in Quebec. Also, the Minister 
of Militia (in charge of recruiting) General Sir Sam Hughes, 
was somewhat less than acceptable to French-Canadians; a 
Militarist, a Mason, an Orangeman, he was the antithesis 
of the French-Canadian. Hughes' chief recruiting officer 
in Quebec was an English, ex-Methodist Minister,33 again, 
not an ideal choice to encourage French-Canadian enlistment.
English-Canadian dominance of the Armed Forces was 
felt to be a stifling factor for French-Canadians. Hughes 
also misunderstood the French-Canadian's heritage when he 
exhorted them to fight for France as the English-Canadian 
was fighting for Britain. In addition, few completely 
French-Canadian units were formed, with recruits often 
being placed in English-speaking units under English 
officers. A typical situation is that described below;
"We were commanded by English officers, in English, 
and it was well known that amongst those officers there 
were some capable of railing publicly at our recruits 
as 'stupid fellows' because these volunteers spoke only 
that unknown tongue called French...Our regiments, of­
ficered by French-Canadians were broken up overseas, 
our officers were humiliated and their men scattered 
amongst the regiments from other provinces. On all
32}%son Wade, The French Canadians Toronto: MacMillan 
Co., 1956), pp. 670-1.
33ibid., p. 709.
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hands advancement and recognition of signal service 
were refused."34
By 1916 only 4,5^ of the Armed Forces were French-Can­
adian out of the 40/o of the population of military age.
The requirements for agriculture and industry also con­
tributed to the drop in recruitment in the army.
The subsequent falling off in recruitment in Quebec 
caused a reaction in the rest of Canada critical of French- 
Canada's response to the common effort. In Quebec City in 
May 1916, while troops taunted French-Canadian youths for 
not being in uniform, the crowd turned upon the troops 
throwing stones. When the French-Canadian 22me Battalion 
left for France, it was ignored in the English-speaking 
towns through which it p a s s e d . 35
When conscription was instituted in 1917, partly 
because of the English-Canadian accusation that Québécois 
were shirking their duty, violence broke out in Quebec.
In Montreal, anti-conscription rallies ended in mob ram- 
pancy with guns being fired; windows broken, and cries for 
revolution. One meeting was broken up only after four 
policemen were injured and one civilian killed. The Mon­
treal Star building was dynamited and plots were uncovered 
where groups were about to blow up the Montreal Gazette. 
the Mont Royal Club and Senator Beaubien's h o m e . 36
The violence in Montreal was mild in comparision
34p. Roy, The Call to Arms (Quebec City: Garneau,
1918), pp. 13-4:
35wade, op. cit., p. 6?1.
l^Ibid.. p. 747.
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with that in Quebec City. Anti-draft meetings ended with 
the burning of the Federal Police station, and the sacking 
of the Chronicle and L'Fvenement. One mob attacked the 
office of the Registrar of the Military Services Act, where 
the conscription records were kept.
On March 30, 1917, the Army was called in to restore 
order. Unfortunately, the troops sent were a Toronto Bat­
talion, emphasizing the rift between French and English 
Canadians. The troops charged with fixed bayonets, and 
cavalry drove back rioting mobs with axe-handles. Soldiers 
were wounded by snipers, so the troops retaliated with 
rifles and machine guns, Cavalry with drawn sabres charged 
crowds. This action left five soldiers and four civilians 
dead, and 58 wounded.37
After the violence and the accompanying split within 
the country, the draft system was not deemed effective 
enough. In fact, less men were recruited under the new 
system than had been under the volunteer enlistment system.
The government, after this violence, changed the leader­
ship of the Military Service Act and modified policy to 
emphasize conciliation rather than coersion. By then, how­
ever, the damage had been done, and French-Canada did not 
forget what it felt had been injustices, as this quote 
illustrates:
"French Canada never forgot the troubles of 1917-
37ibid,, pp. 763-5. 
36lbid., p. 768.
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18 which served to nourish a new nationalist movement 
which was distinctly provincial and sometimes sep­
aratist in outlook,"39
As the above quote illustrates, the conscription 
issue lingered on after the end of hostilities in 1918.
The Federal elections of 1920, 1925 and 1926 raised the 
conscription crisis as an anti-Conservative, pro-Liberal 
issue. In all of these three elections, the Conservative 
Party, (the architect of conscription) remained the epitomy 
of English Canada. The party was not to gain significant 
support in Quebec until the 1930 election under the newly 
elected leader R.B. Bennett.
In the early 1930's, with signs of war impending; 
Fascism growing with remarkable speed and strength, and 
the rearmament of the European nations, "Conscription 
could have become an issue in the general election of 1935* 
The signs were there, but with the Great Depression still 
holding Canada in its grasp, all other issues paled into
insignificance."23
The Great Depression could be considered as one of 
the major factors that contributed to the isolationist 
views of Canadians. The government response to the 
economic depression was to cut spending to the bone in 
all Departments and Ministries of Government. This policy
19Ibid.. pp. 768-
J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World 
War (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), p. 1Ü.
^^Ibid.. p. 11.
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was carried extensively into the Department of Defence* 
even at a time when other countries were beginning to re­
a m  and increase spending on armaments. In Canada, with 
the depression and the viewpoints of isolationists, the 
Armed Forces were looked upon as a purely local defence 
force, only for the inshore protection of Canada, with no 
contingency planning for any response beyond home waters, 
for economic as well as ideological reasons.
One example of this tendency should suffice to illust­
rate government thinking. D.M. Cutherland (a Conservative 
M.P.) in reply to J.L. Ralston's attack of defence cuts, 
with specific reference to the Air Force, explained stan­
dard government policy:
"If there is any portion of the Department of 
National Defence the maintenance of which cannot 
be justified at a time when there are men, women 
and children having difficulty in getting enough 
to eat and wear, that portion must go, and when it 
is a part of the airforce that can be spared at 
this time, it must go..."22
The Depression saw the birth of the C.C.F. Party, 
as an extreme socialist solution to the problems of the 
national economic blight. This party attacked as comm-
Note : In this section, many of the examples used for
illustrative purposes pertain to the military. This part­
icular institution, I think, is perhaps the best "barometer" 
of the sensitivity of government spending and public feeling 
in Canada. The first area to recieve cutbacks in time of 
peace or depression is the military, and the first area to 
be increased in time of hostility is that institution.
22canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1932, p. 360.
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unists may have been an aid to Mackenzie King in his cam­
paign against fascism and communism, which the new left 
was supposed to represent, i.e. Reaction to the C.C.F. 
philosophy brought votes to the L i b e r a l s .
As mentioned, the reasons for isolationism in Canada 
are many, but they seem to center upon the economic aspect 
of overseas Involvement, and the theoretical or philosoph­
ical considerations surrounding Canadian policy of involve­
ment in European affairs.
Certainly the depression era is a major cause for the 
introspective nature of Canadians in the 1930's. However, 
this is certainly not the only reason why Canada followed 
this policy. Other theoretical considerations are based 
upon the relationship of Canadian losses in the first World 
War, to the realization of the destructive nature of modern 
warfare. One such commentary describing modern warfare, 
very much in vogue in 1939, runs as follows:
"To-day the patriot who desires to defend his 
country will refuse to fight; for fighting means not 
the victory of one side and the defeat of the other, 
but the common ruin of civilization. In other words, 
peace-at-any-price is the only way of security or 
defence; patriotism and prudence and pacifism are 
now one and the same thing."24
Also, many pragmatic Canadians saw the national posit­
ion, In terms of geography, as secure from any overseas 
threat. The distance factor in terms of the Atlantic and
23wade, op. cit., pp. 824-30.
24V. Anderson, World Currents and Canada's Course 
(Toronto: T. Nelson & Cons Ltd., 1937), pp. 83-4.
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Pacific Oceans protected Canada from all but nuisance 
raids. Canada, as a trading nation, had over 50/' of her 
trade with the United States, carried by land, and most of 
the rest in British ships protected by the Royal Navy. Also 
it was felt that only an authoritarian nation could wage 
modern warfare effectively, and Canada, in order to win a 
foreign war would have to jeopardize her democratic instit­
utions. These authors thought it not worth the effort to 
"achieve a problematic democracy" in Europe at the risk of 
Canada's own democratic tradition.25
In French Canada, the fundamentals of isolation were 
based on the theory that the Saint Lawrence River Valley 
was the homeland of all French-Canadians, and their supreme 
loyalty was to that nation, not to one across the seas. One 
French-Canadian writer, Leon Gouin, ably sums up this nat­
ionalist point of view,
"French-Canadians are in favour of isolation in 
one form or another. From this it follows that we 
do not intend to have Canada become one of the police­
men of the world...We French-Canadians are determined 
to remain faithful to our policy of 'Canada first'.
May all Canadians realize that for us patriotism has 
no other meaning."26
Other authors attribute the isolationist tendencies 
of Canadians to a sense of geographic security, and a dis­
interest in international affairs because of the separation 
from the troublespots of Europe. One such writer, William 
Strange, explains the relationship between isolation and 
technological achievements in relation to Canada:
25lbid.,DD. 131-Ü. 
Z^Ibid.. pp. 122-3
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"Recent spectacular long-distance flights have 
shaken faith in Canada's geographic isolation from 
the more turbulent sections of the world.,, and the 
recent trans-atlantic trips, may do something to 
arouse and interest in international affairs which 
has hitherto been confined to a quite small number 
of thinking Canadians."2?
To return to the area of economics, in relation to 
isolation, some comparision to the other Dominions can be 
made, showing that isolation is not entirely due to econ­
omic shortages. In a comparision of the defence spending 
of the various Dominions, presumably all with the same ec­
onomic difficulties, Canada falls far behind the other.^ 8 
Also, the British recognized the inadequacy in their Armed 
Forces even for a peacetime role, and pressured the Dominions 
to take over some Imperial responsibilities.
"This recommendation is not, I consider really 
selfish from the imperial point of view, though at 
first sight it may appear so for we may hope, when 
the Australian Army reaches a reasonable standard 
of preparedness, that it will, in war and perhaps 
even in peace, relieve the British Army of some of 
its commitments in the Far and Middle East."29
Canada was asked in 1938 to take part in a joint air
training plan, but resisted until 1939» Also the Dominion
was asked to assist in the defence of the West Indies,
which King refused. Doubtlessly Canada had economic prob-
27w. Strange, Canada, the Pacific and War (Toronto:
T. Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1937), P% 208.
-^^ Per Capita Defence expenditures 1931 to 1936
Canada Australia N.Z. S. Africa Canadian Defence Budget
1931-32 1.71 “5753 1755“ 2.02 17,585,000
1932-33 1.35 2.27 2.00 2.03 13,3^^,000
1933-3^ 1.24 2.40 1.50 2.20 13,149,000
1934-35 1.19 3.17 2.48 2.90 13,o4l,ooo
1935-36 1.41 4.37 2.47 3.47 15,397,000
Sir Cyril Deverall (Chief of Imperial General Staff) 
in King Papers, July 21, 1936
29Ibid.
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lens that could cause this rejection of added defence re­
sponsibility, but the sane argument could have been advanced 
by the other Dominions, Hence, Canadian isolation had sub­
stantially more political and philosophical overtones than 
isolation in the other Dominions. Furthermore, King's 
foreign policy was rather nebulous, and non-commital.80 
Thus, the approach to war was a harder transition for Can­
adians because of this isolationist feeling fed by disorgan­
ization, political uncertainty both at home and abroad, and 
the memory of 1914-18,
The problems of regionalism in Ontario and Quebec have 
already been discussed, but it is essential to fit these 
provinces into a regional balance of interests in respect 
to Great Britain, isolationism, and pro-war sentiments 
characteristic of the various regions of the nation,
Canada can be divided into five regions. The first 
of these, and perhaps the most inward looking was Quebec, 
the heartland of the French-Canadian. The antithesis of 
Quebec was Ontario, the main stronghold or pro-British 
sentiments. The Maritime provinces constituted another 
district of strong pro-British sentiment strongly oriented 
towards Britain and the Imperial connection. The Prairie 
bloc was somewhere between these two extremes in orientation. 
The composition of the Prairies being mainly agrarian, 
largely composed of new Canadians, and reticent to the idea
30k . McMaught, "The 1930's" in J.M.B. Careless, and R.C. 
Brown, ed. The Canadians (Toronto; MacMillan, 1967), p. 269.
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of conscription, which had been forced upon them in World 
War I, tended towards indifference and isolation. The 
last unit, British Columbia, was strongly pro-British, 
but at the same time oriented towards the Pacific and 
the propinquity of the Japanese Empire, with Europe per- 
iferal to their interests, William Strange aptly sums 
up this diversity;
"Briefly and tentatively, it might be said that 
French-Canada would look with askance at any attempt 
to use her manpower in an overseas conflict, that 
the people of the Maritime Provinces would serve the 
Empire without question, that Empire sentiment is 
strong in Ontario, and that the Prairie Provinces 
are the most likely to adopt an attitude of aloofness... 
It is unanimous, however, in agreeing that an attack 
on the shores of this country would have to be re­
sisted tooth and nail."31
Strange qualifies this statement by adding that these 
are the main differences, regionally, but the whole mosaic 
is vastly complex and cannot account for the diversity 
within these regions. Also, he explains, these concepts 
are not static, but ever changing, to add another factor
to this problem.32
Another potential cleavage in the Canadian political 
structure was the attitude of the four major political 
parties to a possible European war. The diverse nature of 
politics generally is such that political parties will tend 
to disagree on major issues, if only to create a differing
31strange, op. cit., p. 202 
S^ibid.
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platform. In Canada, in 1939, this was not the case. In 
the Special Session of Parliament in September, all the 
major parties lined up behind the Prime Minister with 
strong pro-war platforms, although for differing reasons.
The Liberal Party, after the 1935 elections emerged 
with a huge majority of the seats (179) but as a divided 
party. One section was extremely pro-British, while the 
large French-Canadian element tended towards isolation.
Some liberals were even against measures designed for home 
defence, as late as 1938.^8
King set about uniting his own party behind a limited, 
cautious, pro-war program, with the promise of: 1. The 
defence of Canada first, 2. Assistance to Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 3. The applying of economic pressure on the 
enemy, 4. The control of trade, manufacturing and food to 
supply Britain with her needs, 5. No conscription for over­
seas s e r v i c e .8^ This approach united the party in support 
of King's pro-war stance, as well as to gather support from 
the majority of Canadians. The debates in the House of 
Commons on foreign policy in 1939 helped unite Canada be­
hind his approach to w a r . 8 ^
Thus, most moderate and semi-isolationist groups
83g .M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and International 
Security (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1947), pp. 285-6.
8^r,M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs. 1939-41 
(Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1943), pp. 11-2.
85canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 30-1, 1939, 
pp. 2408-75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
supported King's policies. The Liberal government gained 
much support from the Conservative Party under Dr. Manion. 
After the defeat of R.B. Bennett in 1935, the Conservatives 
emerged with only 38 seats, but as the leading opposition 
party. If anything, the conservatives were far more pro- 
British than the Liberal Party, and pressured for a united 
Commonwealth foreign policy and an increase in the navy. 
Many Conservatives pushed the government to institute con­
scription in the event of w a r .36
The only hindrances the Liberals encountered in dealing 
with the Conservatives were the extreme pro-British stands 
which compromised Canada's sovereignty and any chance of 
neutrality in an impending struggle. One such example irr­
itated King severely:
"Whenever a Canadian representative was suggested 
for Washington or Japan or South America, the pointed 
finger was raised and the Tory cry of disloyalty to 
England was set up and Canada's identity remained 
'zero."37
The position of the Social Credit (17 seats) was 
strongly pro-British and supported King to the hilt. This 
right-wing Alberta based party, although it did not delve 
deeply into foreign affairs, lined up squarely behind the 
pro-British elements in King's Party in 1939.8®
The most nebulous of the major parties was the C.C.F.
86carter, op. cit., pp. 286-7.
8?King Papers, "Memoranda & Notes", Vol. 57, p. C44808. 
8®Carter, op. cit., p. 286.
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(8 seats) The leader of this party, J.S. Woodsworth was a 
devout pacifist, and led the C.C.t. until the Special 
Session of Parliament in September 1939, under a platform 
of collective security, and against re-armament in any 
f o r m .89 However, in 1939, Woodsworth was the only anti-war 
member of his party, and he stepped down as leader, after 
the declaration of war, in favour of M.J. Coldwell, who 
represented the mass of C.C.F. voters, as well as the basic 
philosophy of the party,
"Coldwell saw that if war resulted from the bungling 
of capitalists, it could not be lost without destroying 
all the hopes of socialism. The brave new world of 
the C.C.F. would be postponed indefinitely by war. 
Defeat would doom it for all imaginable time."40
Consequently, no large political rifts were apparent
in Canada in 1939, with the exception of a few individual
dissenters in the House of Commons, and in this facet of
political life, Canada entered the war as a united nation.
Interest groups in Canada, unlike the actions of the
Political Parties, tended to polarize their membership
into extreme positions. The military interest groups
epitomize this tendency with their extreme pro-British
philosophy, both within the regular military establishment,
and among the Legion groups across the country.
The regular military advocated strong imperial ties
with the United Kingdom, and close co-operation with the
8 9 l b i d .
^^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 256.
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British Armed Forces in peace as well as in war. If any 
group in Canada epitomized the principle, "When Britain is 
at war, Canada is at war," it was most strongly held by 
the military, above and beyond the official government 
position.
It was the military that first (in 1935) perceived 
the threat of war from the axis powers, and set about a re­
armament program that would provide the nucleus for an 
overseas expeditionary force.4l Financial restrictions, 
however, limited Canada's Armed Forces in acquiring the 
equipment needed, not only for overseas service, but also 
for home d e f e n c e .42 Consequently, defence estimates had to 
be cut back, even in 1938 when the government presumably 
was convinced of the necessity for rearmament. This is 
illustrated in a memorandum to King from Defence Minister 
Ian MacKenzie's office (January 19, 1938) after an appeal 
by King to cut back proposed expenditures by the government. 
Mackenzie replied:
"The estimates that were submitted to me by the 
various branches totalled thirty-eight million dollars. 
When, however, I was told by council that expenditures 
of Defence could not exceed thirty-five million I 
issued instructions accordingly and our estimates have , 
been cut down to less than thirty-five million dollars."^3
The regular military, however, was restrained in its 
outlets for expression of policies and platform. This, on
^^Department of Defence Memorandum, in King Papers, 
Vol. 221, pp. 189810-17.
^^Ibid.. pp. 190004-8.
^8xing Papers, Vol. 253, p. 2l6026.
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the other hand, was not true of Legion groups which e pressed 
extreme nationalism, both vocally and violently. One in­
cident on April 19, 1939 serves to illustrate the vehement 
nature of Legion activities. The "Canadian Society for 
German Culture" which was showing a German film (approved 
by the Alberta Censorship Bureau) was stormed by Legion 
members and ex-servicemen and forced to stop showing the 
films.Subsequently, the Alberta censors refused to pass 
German-language films due to the disorder they would cause.
The military establisment after 1935 closely compl­
imented the industrial and manufacturing groups within 
Canada. The military needed equipment, and pushed for 
"pilot projects" in Canada to develop the arms industry, a 
policy greeted with alacrity by the industrialists.^6 The
defence industry of Canada, prior to 1939 was inadequate
in all fields, and relied heavily upon private industry.
Production in quantity was limited to small arms and amm-
47unition, although insufficient for Canada's needs.
The British government also pushed for Canada's 
private industry to retool for weapons production. The
^Scing Papers, Vol 282, p. 238493. \
^^Ibid.. p. 238505.
^^Memorandum from Canadian Chief of Ctaff, Major-Gen. 
E.C. Ashton, January 1, 1937:
"Practically all other types of equipment can be 
manufactured in civilian factories and it is advisable that 
contracts should be let for as many types of articles as 
possible in order that pilot plants may be established and 
skill acquired. In event of a serious emergency these 
could be expanded to serve as models for other units."
C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto: 
The Ryerson Press, 194o), p. 142.
^^Tbid.. p. 129.
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infamous Bren gun contract, by which the British and Can­
adian governments contracted for 7,000 Bren guns each from 
Canadian companies, was subject to much discussion on the 
public level and in Parliament as to profiteering and 
graft. This incident undermined the armaments buildup as 
well as public confidence in the general scheme for defence, 
necessitating action by the government.
"In regards to the proposed expenditures on defence, 
I should like to suggest that they might be made more 
palatable if accompanied by legislation for the con­
trol, both in peace and war, of profits on munitions. 
Demand for some form of control in this connection 
is certain to be widespread and e m p h a t i c . "4o
The tightening of contracts in Canada was accompanied
by the limited amount of munitions and weapons contracts
from Britain causing the Canadian manufacturers to send a
delegation to Britain. One commentary predicted the failure
of this trip to Britain, and the subsequent pressure that
would be brought to bear upon the Canadian government.
"The Canadian manufacturers are likely to be dis­
appointed when they learn of the small scale of the 
British intended orders and there will be, therefore, 
great pressure on the Canadian government to fulfil 
the British conditions by making a large range of 
purchases."49
Part of the impetus for any substantial increases in 
expenditures on the military was due to the fear of internal 
sabotage by dissident groups in case of war. This, if 
anything, helped the manufacturers retool for weapons pro-
^^lan Mackenzie to King, in King Papers, September 29,
1936.
^^King Papers, Vol. 272, p. 230363.
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duction. The major fascist parties in Canada could, it 
was felt, have provided most of this potential force of 
saboteurs.
Again, comparisons with sabotage in World War I by- 
German agents were cited as examples of what could happen 
in case of another war with Germany. There were attempts 
in that war to blow up the locks on the Welland Canal, as 
well as some factories and railway bridges, but only minor 
damage resulted. However, "today an enemy directing war 
against Canada from Berlin would have a much larger army 
of agents within the country than was available during the 
last w a r . " 5 0
Also there is some evidence supporting German attempts 
to tie, Nazi groups in Canada to the German government. In 
German-Canadian schools the textbooks used were printed in 
Germany, and teachers were organized under a division of 
the Nazi Teacher's League.Alleged close attachment be­
tween the German consular service and German-Canadian organ­
izations was one of the charges levelled at the Nazi's, with 
some supportive evidence. (German Consul-General Krapp was 
a member of the Deutsche Bund in Kitchener: He was photo­
graphed with this group)^2 other charges made center upon 
the pressures exerted upon German-Canadians to join Nazi 
groups or have their relatives in Germany suffer. One such
^9»:\jow"Publications. op. cit., p. 21. 
^^Ibid., p. 16.
^^Ibid.. pp. 6-7.
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statement describing Nazi Party activity reads as follows;
"One of the main tasks is to penetrate and seize 
control of every German organization in Canada. This 
is done through threats when necessary. Members of 
various German-Canadian fraternal societies don't re­
sist Nazi demands for control when they know that 
opposition means the concentration camp or worse for 
their relatives in Germany,"53
Although poorly documented by this particular group, 
other more reliable sources do substantiate this allegation, 
Ian Mackenzie also received letters from German-Canadians 
who had pressure put upon relatives in Germany to force 
them to join the Canadian Nazi Party.54 This type of sit­
uation caused concern within the Department of Defence, in 
regards to sabotage, as a study on Defence measures in Feb­
ruary, 1939 illustrates;
"The purpose of this study is to consider only 
Defence Measures against aerial attacks and sabotage 
in the event of a World War_in which the British 
Empire would be i n v o l v e d . "55
This did not seem far-fetched at the time, since Nazi 
organizations had helped cause the downfall of Austria and 
Czecho-Slovakia, There was also strong evidence of Nazi 
influence in Danzig, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria as well 
as large Nazi Parties in Holland and Argentina. France and 
Britain had small but vocal fascist groups. Nazi Party mem­
bers In the United States had been convicted in connection 
with an espionage plot.^^ Given these factors, there was
53ibid.. p. 7.
5^King Papers, Vol, 272, p. 230346.
5^ Ibid.
^^"Now" pub., op. cit., p. 21.
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good reason to suspect Nazi motives in associating them­
selves closely with German-Canadian groups.
Nevertheless, within the context of this threat, plans 
were being worked out on a contingency basis for the inter­
ning of aliens in case of war. On March l4, 193# the first 
Interim report of the Committee on the treatment of aliens 
and alien property was instituted, and shortly thereafter 
a statement was issued:
"The Committee, in studying the problem referred 
to it, has recognized that time does not permit the 
working out in precise detail of schemes for the in­
ternment of enemy aliens."57
It is interesting to note that these discussions did 
not mention Japanese-Canadians as a perceived threat, but 
concentrated their attention entirely upon German and It­
alian aliens, clearly shewing that the threat orientation 
was towards Europe rather than the Orient in 1938-39.
Given the vocal nature of Canada's fascists, this was 
to be the focus through 1938 to 19^1. Adrien Arcand, Supreme 
Leader of the National Unity Party of Canada boasted (Feb.
22, 1938), "Then we will start the political march on Ottawa, 
that will end up with power for us."58Arcand also claimed 
2,500 uniformed "shock-troops" among 30,000 members as the 
spearhead for this task.^9
Watson Kirkconnell described this party as the largest 
and best organized of the Nazi Groups in Canada:
✓
r.Q
59
^King Papers, Vol. 272, pp. 230184-5. 
)w" Pub,. op. cit., p. 3.
Ibid., pp. 8-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
"... the 'Blue-Shlrt' National Unity Party is the 
most specifically Nazi in type and affiliation. This 
group, which embraces both English and French, has 
claimed 80,000 members in Quebec and 12,000 in Ont­
ario," 60
The leaders of this Party professed a strong bond 
between the German Nazi Party and themselves. Adrien 
Arcand claimed to be a personal friend of Adolf Hitler.
Another alarming trend was the presence of Nazis among 
the Militia. J.G. Farr, a fascist leader, stated that more 
than 300 members of the Militia in Ontario were Party mem­
bers, 240 of them in Toronto. Also, "the Nationalist Party 
has members in the Toronto Scottish and the Queen's Own 
Rifles as well as in the Royal Canadian Artillery,"62 This 
statement appeared after the publication of pictures in a 
Toronto newspaper (June 10, 1938) showing six uniformed non­
commissioned officers at a meeting in Toronto of the Nazi 
Party.
Much the same sort of allocations were levelled against 
the Italian fascist groups, in terms of connection with 
Italian consular officials, and in relation to Italian­
speaking schools. Borne mention was also made of a Ukrain­
ian Nazi Organization, though evidently only present in 
an embryonic stage.
IVhatever the relation between the perceived threat
^%irkconnell, op, cit., p. 108. 
*^Ibid.. p. 109.
"Now" Pub, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
8^ibid.
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from these groups and the actual threat, they have to be 
considered in respect to the total picture of public op­
inion in Canada in 1939.
Public opinion analysis in 1939 ranges in impression 
from extreme pro-war to complete apathy. The mean between 
these two extremities is difficult, if not impossible, to 
pinpoint accurately. Beginning with pro-war analysts, Watson 
Kirkconnell epitomizes this end of the spectrum. He states;
"Anglo-Canadians are thus convinced not merely of 
the iniquity of Nazidom and its menace to the world 
in general, but also of the specific impact of its 
ambitions on Canada and Canadian d e m o c r a c y ."64
He uses this illustration to show that 60^ of Canad­
ians were strongly behind the government and King's pro­
war stance. Kirkconnell lists most of the rest of Canadian 
minority groups as pro-British and p r o - w a r . & 5
French-Canada, Kirkconnell sees as intensely religious, 
tied to the clergy and to Rome. (Strong traditional tie 
with Italy) He does not go deeper into the French-Canadian 
problem, however. This general trend is continued by
^^Kirkconnell, op. cit., pp. 109-10 
^^Other Minorities;
Numbers Stance
German-Canadians 600,000 Loyal to Canada, but want
neutrality in European wars.
Ukrainian-Canadians 250,000 Divided into Nationalists and
Communists, all pro-Britain.
Nordic-Canadians 230,000 Solidly opposed to Nazi's high­
est enlistment rate in W.W.I.
Jewish-Canadians 157,000 Anti-Nazi. Strongly loyal to
Great Britain.
Polish-Canadians 136,000 Strong support of Canada and
Polish struggle.
Italian-Canadians 100,000 Hatred of Communism, urged
neutrality.
Ibid., pp. 109-190
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other groups uncertain of the French-Canadian position, as 
is illustrated by one analysis attempted by Round Table;
"During all this period feeling in the country 
(outside Quebec) has been hardening. Last September, 
under the immediate threat of war, there was abundent 
evidence of a widespread response to the call to de­
fend the Empire and the broader call to defend our 
whole way of living."66
This analysis was substantiated by a synthesis of 
public opinion in Canadian newspapers in response to King's 
foreign policy statements in early 1939 (Appendix H) These 
papers forcefully supported King's pro-British speeches, 
but the majority declared that he did not go far enough in 
his support of Great Britain. Reaction in the Quebec Press 
was noted as "critical", and the commentary concluded with 
a description of minor demonstrations by French-Ganadians 
in Quebec City and Montreal.
Other articles polarized Canadians into two groups; 
"Imperialists" and "Nationalists". The imperialists "ad­
vocate a common Empire front in foreign affairs and accept 
the idea of automatic Canadian participation in an Empire 
war,II68 Nationalists, according to the same article, saw 
Canada in isolationist terms, and as a North American state 
rather than a component of the British Commonwealth.
The article added that the great majority of Canadians 
did not support either of these highly vocal groups, but
66(1Canada and the War Danger", op. cit., p. 583.
^^"The Dominions and Imperial Defence", op. cit.,
p. 549.
^6»canada and the War Danger", op. cit., p. 575.
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were either uninformed on international relations or be­
wildered by the Dominion's role in the w o r l d . T h i s  cynical 
approach was carried to the extreme by one author, who des­
cribed Canadian "Public Opinion" as a non-entity. His 
account is as follows;
"There is a prevalent illusion among the Canadian 
people that they are still free to make up their minds 
as they please concerning their relations to the next 
European war and that they are still uncommitted. A 
country, however, whose citizens are so uninformed 
about foreign affairs as are the citizens of Canada, 
and whose attitude is so habitually apathetic is liable 
to have its mind made up for it without being conscious 
of what has h a p p e n e d ."70
However, by 1939, appeasement had been recognized as 
as failure, as King revealed in the House of Commons on 
March 20, 1939. Hitler was by this time recognized as the 
aggressor in international affairs, and would have to be 
stopped in the near future. The failure of the Munich 
Agreement had shown the Canadian people this.^^
Public opinion probably reflected all of the above 
tendencies, but entered World War II partially united, with 
no large groups of e treme isolationists, in support of the 
war measures of Mackenzie King. King was certainly cog­
nisant of this fact as the following quote illustrates;
"He realized that this minority included a high 
proportion, even a majority, of French-Canadians; 
that they had accepted the decision to go to war 
reluctantly and that they had done so only because
69lbid.. p. 550.
Anderson, op. cit., p. 130,
71"Canada and the War Danger", op. cit., p. 572.
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of his pledge that the government of which he was 
head would not resort to conscription for overseas
service."72
Thus, even Quebec did not represent a hard-core of 
opposition to the government, but exhibited what could be 
described as "reluctant consent". Ontario, on the other 
hand, felt King's measures far too weak in their overall 
commitment to Great Britain. The rest of Canada, with 
the exception of small isolationist or purely pacifistic 
groups, fell somewhere between these two poles. Canada, 
to sura up, entered World War II, from the point of view 
of public opinion, united in the belief that a general 
European war could not exclude Canadian participation, 
but became disunited over the extent of that participation 
from a "home defence" stance to a "rally round the Empire" 
feeling.
^^Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 22.
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CHAPTER 3
The Political System;
Structures and Decision-makers
In order to assess the decision-making process of Can­
adian government in 1939, it is necessary to discuss two 
interrelated factors; The first of these is an analysis of 
the political system, as well as the institutional arrange­
ments of the political system. (The Cabinet, House of Commons, 
and the Senate, among others) Secondly, the platforms and 
interests of the major decision-makers in Canadian govern­
ment will be examined. The men who have been chosen for 
analysis are the officials who not only held most of the 
executive power in the decision-making process, but who 
were also the closest advisors of the Prime Minister.
These two themes will be discussed in conjunction with 
each other rather than as separate sections since it is 
difficult to separate the man from the political system and 
discuss him, as it were, in a vacuum. Thus, the platforms 
and the viewpoints of these politicians and civil Servants 
will be introduced in the appropriate sections of the paper 
dealing with their particular organ of the political system.
Implicit in this section is the idea that the role of 
the decision-maker is shaped by the institutional structure.
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The role of the actor can be enhanced by the institutional 
arrangements, or inhibited by the lack of Influence within 
the structure of government. This was especially true in 
the case of Mackenzie King. Institutional structures en­
hanced his role and power within the system making him the 
focal point of foreign policy decision-making. The weakness 
of alternative institutions within the political structure 
helped place more power in the hands of the Prime Minister 
by eliminating potential sources of opposition.
The structure of the Canadian political system in 1939, 
for the most part, did not differ conceptually in terms of 
function and power with the present day political system,
*
except that decision-making was far less complicated in 1939. 
In light of this, the analysis of the decision to enter 
World War II is a much easier process than to do a comp­
arable study of a decision made in I960 or 1970.
Starting at the executive level of government, the 
first office is that of the Governor General, the Head of 
State. The Governor General's powers decreased as Canada 
gradually affirmed sovereignty from Britain. In a legal 
sense, by 1939 the Governor General was considered a rep-
3^1 have chosen much of the detail of government structure 
from H.MoD. Clokie, Canadian Government and Politics 
Toronto: Longman's Green & Co., 1944. Clokie describes 
the functioning of the Canadian government in terms of the 
pre-war years: i.e. He sees wartime inovations in admin­
istration as somewhat transitory as in the case of World 
War I, and he bypasses the majority of these, giving a 
fairly accurate appraisal of the Canadian political system 
as it existed in the pre-war era.
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representative of the Crown, but only with titular authority, 
having in fact no power in the decision-making process 
except to ratify decisions of the Cabinet. However, as one 
writer R.M. Dawson, observed, the powers of the Head of 
State did not decline totally into impotence;
"Authority has gradually been succeeded by in­
fluence; Obvious and aggressive leadership has been 
replaced by the more subtle and intangible pressure 
of suggestion and pursuasion. For the Governor's 
influence on government is not negligible."1
The Governor General acted upon the advice of the Can­
adian Privy Council, a body including active members of 
the Cabinet under a President. In 1939, the Prime Minister 
occupied this position, which helped curb the power of this 
body in terms of opposition to government policy. In this 
way, the Governor General assumed a formal, but minor, pos­
ition in the formulating of policy, while the Prime Min­
ister became the focal point of decision-making.
The functioning of the executive was blurred by the 
fact that MacKenzie King filled a number of roles in the 
political structure. His acting as President of the Privy 
Council, Secretary of State for External Affairs, as well 
as serving as Prime Minister may have streamlined the dec­
ision-making procedure, but it also confused the power re­
lationship in the e x e c u t i v e .2 King played upon this im­
precision and took a Machiavellian pleasure in his complete
^R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: Univ. 
of Toronto Press, 1^6), p. l65.
Q
Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 6.
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dominance over the Cabinet, as Bruce Hutchinson explains;
"Even the solidarity of his Cabinets was a charade 
which kept the chief actor perpetually amused. He 
encouraged the feuds of his Ministers because their 
divisions strengthened him. Often he disagreed with 
policies executed in his name, denouncing them indig­
nantly in private, and was always chuckling at the 
Opposition's failure to see his colleagues obvious
blunders."3
The above description is a fairly good appraisal of 
the type of power and influence wielded by King, over the 
Cabinet, and in the administration of government policies.
MacKenzie King saw the Cabinet as a body of advisors 
as much as a policy formation center. He expressed this 
opinion at various times during his administration. The 
following quote is a typical example;
"How best any action of mine may serve to maintain 
that unity is something of which I, alone, can be the 
judge. That is a responsibility of which attaches to 
the head of state of an administration at any time, 
but doubly so at a time when the nation is at war."4
King saw his position, clearly, as one of immense 
power, especially in the area of foreign policy. He con­
ducted foreign policy stealthily and possessively, and few 
of his staff or Cabinet Ministers were able to clarify 
policy during times of crisis.^ This, on the other hand, 
is not to imply that King ignored his Cabinet and made
^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 9.
^King, "Aggression in Hitler's Mind had no limits", 
op. cit., p. 8.
^H.L. Keenleyside, The Growth of Canadian Policies in 
External Affairs (durham. N.C.; Duke Univ. Press, 19o0), 
pp. 59-60
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decisions completely on his own. The standard procedure 
adopted at Cabinet meetings Involved a general airing of 
views by each member interested or involved in a certain 
decision, followed by a discussion, with King leading, 
steering the Cabinet towards his point of view. As one 
writer commented on the value of this type of format:
"...only very rarely did he insist on getting his 
own way when a clear majority of his colleagues diss­
ented. He was wise enough to realize that opposition 
from his colleagues usually reflected the opposition 
to be expected from the public, and he did not believe 
in sailing right into formidable opposition if it could 
be avoided. Yet, while he did not intimidate his coll­
eagues, he certainly dominated the C a b i n e t . "6
Thus, a consensus was reached, with King's opinion
usually being adopted with modifications as the policy of
the government. Due to the principle of Cabinet solidarity,
little is known about these discussions, and how members
of Cabinet were forced to follow King's policies.
Much, nevertheless, can be surmized about King's approach
to government and his ability to predominate his Cabinet,
from an analysis of his views on government and power, as
well as by a study of his character and abilities. King,
as one author states, was an extreme pragmatist who could
actually perceive a demand from the people before it could
be articulated. It was upon this "sixth sense" that King
rose to power and built his government.? He was a canny
^Pickersgill, op. cit. , p. 7.
^C. Ondaatje, and R. Catherwood- The Prime Ministers 
of Canada (Toronto: Canyon Press, 1967), p. 104.
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politician, with a remarkable resilience as his raurcuric 
career indicates.
After the 1921 and 1925 elections King had to work 
with minority governments and the tenuous support of the 
agrarian based Progressive Party, a situation he handled 
extremely well. In 1926, a scandal revealed a corrupt 
Custom's Department engaged in the illegal trade of liquor 
between Canada and the United States. The King government 
was able to keep this crisis under control. The Beauharn- 
ois Scandal of 1931, where the Liberals were charged with 
accepting a bribe of $700,000 from the Beauharnois Power 
Company in return for concessions along the St. Lawrence 
River, was also managed by the Party.
Perhaps King's most serious mistake in international 
affairs was to misjudge both Hitler and the power of the 
appeasement policy adopted by the Canadian government.
Again, King was able to weather the change in attitude 
from extreme isolation to belligerence. (This feat was not 
accomplished by the British leader Neville Chamberlain) Mr. 
King's handling of the Conscription Crises from 1939 to 1944 
was just as masterly performed.
The controlling of the above mentioned crises was mainly 
due to the power possessed by the Prime Minister, and his 
ability to make fast effective decisions. This was espec­
ially true in the case of foreign policy determination as 
the following evaluation demonstrates;
"...he appears to have made many foreign policy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
decisions himself and to have consulted cabinet coll­
eagues and departmental officials only when he thought 
it necessary. With the exception of the few months 
prior to his retirement, Mr. King kept the External 
Affairs portfolio and the ultimate power of making 
foreign policies clearly to himself.
This power of unilateral decision-making is described
in some detail by a former secretary to the Prime Minister,
Dr. James Gibson. Gibson illustrates King's propensity to
make quick decisions, perhaps in many cases without much
forethought:
"Much of Canadian foreign policy, especially during 
World War II, was written in marginal notes with a 
blunt pencil. A blunt pencil is not the ordinary 
instrument of sustained thought or extended writing; 
it is the agency of the moment and of on-the-spot 
decisions."9
Dr. Gibson cites several examples of the King penchance 
for this type of decision-making. One instance used by this 
author centered upon the status of Canadian diplomatic 
missions, especially in Washington and Moscow. (Both Leg­
ations in the early war period) A note from the Department 
of External Affairs asking whether it would be appropriate 
to raise the status of the Washington Legation to that of 
an Embassy was delivered to King. It was almost immediately 
initialled by that above-mentioned blunt pencil, "Yes, At 
once. The sooner the b e t t e r . W i t h i n  a few months (under
&R.B. Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1969), P• 10.
9or. James Gibson, "MacKenzie King's Blunt Pencil", 
Ottawa Journal. June 14, 1952., p. 6.
l^ Ibid.
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King's Initiative) the United States, Soviet, Brazilian, 
Argentine and Chinese Legations were raised to Embassies,
This tendency of MacKenzie King was not just a policy 
formulated under the pressure of a war-time administration. 
Deliberations were made in the pre-war years in much the 
same manner as described above. One particular instance 
involved the repatriation of the Canadian "MacKenzie-Pap- 
ineau" Brigade from Spain after the collapse of the Spanish 
government. O.D. Skelton sent a memorandum to King outlining 
the possible solutions to the above-mentioned problem. 
Skelton's suggestion was answered by the cryptic comment,
"I approve", from King, and the program was carried out.^^
King tried, at some length, to relate his power position 
to a direct mandate received from the people, which he 
used to justify his utilization of maximum authority in 
government and negate the fact that he was directly respon­
sible to Parliament, not to the people, for the power he 
exercised in conjunction with his Cabinet.
"My power comes from the people...It does not arise 
from any 'superman' power that I possess...I felt that 
I had that power by being true to the people and to 
the promises I had given them. I did not think it 
was a mark of leadership to try to make people do what 
one wanted them to do."l2
King's position as leader of the Cabinet also enhanced 
his decision-making powers. He appointed or selected members 
from among his closer advisors as the Heads of the various
^^External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin of the Department 
of External Affairs, Vol. XXIII, (February, 1971), p. 57»
1 ?
King Diary, cited in Ondaatje, op. cit., p. 104.
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government departments. These men were chosen for political 
reasons rather than administrative ability or special know­
ledge and the actual administration of the departments re­
mained in the hands of senior civil servants. This policy 
was considered less dangerous to a Ministry except in time 
of war. In this contingency, for example, Defence Minister 
Ian Mackenzie was replaced by Norman Rogers, a man more 
adept at administration than was the f o r m e r ,^3
In the Cabinet, French-Canada was amply represented 
both by Ministers from Quebec and Ministers considered by 
Québécois as Francophone, The chief issue for these 
Cabinet Ministers in the pre-war years was conscription.
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet were trusted implicitly 
by most Québécois when they promised no conscription. Le 
Soleil, a Quebec City paper ran such frontpage headlines as:
"That which Sir Wilfred Laurier in opposition was 
unable to do. King and Lapointe in power have accomp­
lished. ' Then large sub-titles: '1917 Laurier combats 
conscription. 1939 King, Lapointe, Cardin, Power and 
Dandurand, save us from conscription."!^
Chief of the above mentioned Ministers was Ernest La­
pointe; Secretary of State, Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General of Canada, the closest of King's colleagues except 
for 0,D, Skelton, and a man who enjoyed tremendous power, 
respect and Influence in Quebec as well as in Ottawa. He 
was chosen by King in 1922 as his French-Canadian "partner".
13Norman Ward, ed. The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Tor­
onto: MacMillan of Canada, 1966), p, 1Ü2.
l^lbid., p, 129.
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"Already King had chosen Lapointe as his permanent 
French-Caaadian partner and now stowed him away in 
Fisheries, pending Gouin's retirement. The King-La- 
pointe coalition, like that of Baldwin and Lafontaine, 
of MacDonald and Cartier, Laurier and Fielding, was 
destined to be long and fruitful."!?
King was unable to understand French-Canada or even to 
speak French, and depended heavily upon Lapointe both to 
interpret the feeling of Quebec, politically, and to look 
out for the Party's interests in that Province. In the 
Riddell incident of 1935, Lapointe, in King's absence, at 
first supported the League sanctions on Italy introduced 
by Riddell, Under pressure from public opinion in Quebec, 
the French-speaking press, and under attack by French- 
Canadian political leaders, Lapointe revised his position 
and repudiated Riddell in Geneva,!&
Lapointe was heartily opposed to conscription, not for 
King's reasons of "national unity", but because he felt 
that no government had the moral right to impose such leg­
islation upon a free people and that every man would have 
to chose for himself whether or not he would go to war, 
Lapointe also saw that neutrality in a European war could 
not be a viable policy for Canada, The vast majority of 
people would favour belligerence on the side of Great 
Britain, and Quebec was not strong enough to alter this 
decision alone. Neutrality would be almost impossible
!^Bruce Hutchinson, Mr. Prime Minister (Toronto; 
Longman's Canada Ltd., 19'ë*+), p", 213.
!&G, Donaldson, Fifteen Men (Toronto; Doubleday,
1969), pp. 246-8,
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without countenancing the risk of a civil war.!?
For both of the above reasons, Lapointe pushed for 
active participation in World War II, short of conscription, 
a policy similar to that of King, but for differing reasons. 
King reasoned that national unity, above all else, had to 
be maintained, while Lapointe took a more parochial view, 
strictly mirroring French-Canada, and the individual 
rights of the Canadien, In fact, it was Lapointe rather 
than King, who delivered the emotional "call to arms" in 
Parliament on September 9, 1939 in one of the finest pro­
nouncements ever delivered by a Canadian patriot:
"God give Canadians the light which will indicate 
to them where their duty lies in this hour of trial, 
so that our children and our children's children may 
inherit a land where freedom and peace shall prevail, 
where our social, political and religious institutions 
may be secure, and from which the tyrannical doctrines 
of Nazism and communism are forever banished. Yes,
God bless C^ada. God bless our Queen, God bless 
our King,"!^
Almost synonymous with Lapointe in the minds of the 
people was the other Liberal defender of Quebec, C.P. Power, 
(a war hero, an Irish-Canadian from Montreal, trusted im­
plicitly by French-Canadians) Their views were linked so 
closely that almost invariably their names were linked in 
terms of policy statements in support of French-Canadian 
interests. Power also served as a link between the two 
dominant cultures of Canada; An interpreter of French
!?Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 3!, 1939,
pp. 2^66-8.
18Ibid,, September 9, 1939, p. 69.
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Canada to the Engllsh-Canadlan populace.^9
Power deplored conscription as did Lapointe and King. 
Power's view, however, was anti-militarist and pacifistlc 
rather than moralistic or politically minded. As Power 
stated in 1937; "With regard to war, I went overseas in 
one war. I returned. I'll never go back, and I'll never
p A
send anyone else." ^ Power maintained a close relationship 
with King, but was regarded as somewhat reckless. He never 
enjoyed the respect or confidence of King that Lapointe 
attained, but was held in high regard due to his political 
"flair" that King thought was unique in his Cabinet.^^After 
King's decision to replace MacKenzie as Defence Minister, 
Power was the prime candidate until he pointed out that 
having the Defence Minister from Quebec might raise the issue 
of conscription again, thereby destroying his chance to 
become Defence Minister himself. Power's administrative 
ability was excellent, his oratory, wit and popularity 
with the voters made him one of the most influential men
pp
in the Cabinet.
All three of these leaders, King, Lapointe and Power 
agreed on the Canadian approach to World War II. There 
would be no thought of neutrality in the coming struggle, 
and a commitment to Quebec promising no conscription.
!%utchlnson. The Incredible Canadian, op. cit., p. 2?2.
^^Ward, op. cit., p. 123.
21
Pickersglll, op. cit., p. 8.
Op
^ Hutchinson, Mr. Prime Minister, op. cit., p. 2lS.
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Again, King came to these conclusions through a political 
policy advocating national unity; Lapointe through a 
reflection of the views of Québécois, and Power through an 
emotional, personal approach, reluctantly accepting the 
fact that Canada could not remain neutral in a European war.
In opposition to this triumverate was Colonel J.L. 
Ralston, destined to resign when conscription was not intro­
duced at his request in 1944. He was a man of immense 
ability and character, respected by King, but with views 
on conscription juxtaposed to those of his l e a d e r . ^3 
Ralston became the unofficial leader of the English-Canad- 
ian segment of the Cabinet, and was seen by King as a 
possible successor.2^
However, Ralston's views did not have much effect upon 
the 1939 decisions, since he rejoined the Cabinet on Sept­
ember 6, 1939 at the height of the war participation de­
liberations, after an absence of four years. The Cabinet 
had already met and decided upon belligerence, but to bring 
this pro-war, pro-conscription, English Canadian into the 
Cabinet at this particular point, certainly helped sway 
English Canadians toward King and way from the Conservatives.
From his first Cabinet meeting on Leptember 7, 1939, 
Ralston favoured a large expeditionary force, as well as 
conscription, a position reflected by a number of English-
^^Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 25.
^^King Diary, cited in Pickersgill, pp. 25-6
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n
Canadian ministers.^/ Ralston did much to hasten the sending 
of the 1st Canadian Division to England in 1939, and helped 
polarize the Cabinet into the "limited war" faction of 
King, Lapointe and Power, and the "total war" group under 
his leadership.
Among this "total war" group was C.D. Rowe, who was to 
rise in prominence during the war years and afterwards. It 
was he who was credited with building the vast Canadian arm­
aments Industry that by 19^1 was capable of producing all 
the equipment needed for a full infantry division every six 
weeks.26 It was in this area that Howe was especially com­
petent, even before the war.
Perhaps Howe's greatest triumph in the pre-war years 
was his defence of the government over the controversial 
Bren gun contract. In 1938, the government was charged by 
the Opposition with favouritism, laxity in the upper levels 
of the Department of National Defence, and profiteering, in 
the awarding of a contract for the manufacture of twelve 
thousand Bren machine guns to the John Inglis Co, of Toronto, 
Howe's performance in support of government policy was 
masterful, as one author indicated:
"C.D. Howe was not directly Involved in the Bren 
contract. Nevertheless, in a House debate conducted 
almost entirely on an emotional level, the Minister
of Transport was to make the most lucid, concise and
Z^ibid., pp. 28-9.
^^Donaldson, op. cit., p. 157,
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best Informed contribution to come from übe government 
front bench during the long and heated fight over the 
Davis Report."27
Howe's initiatives led to the establishment of a 
Defence Purchasing Board to eliminate profiteering on war 
contracts. His able defence of the Bren gUn Contract gave 
Canada an operating machine gun plant six months before war 
broke out. It was from that date that Howe became Minister 
of Munitions and Supply, and industry started the transition 
from peace to war production due to his handling of the 
Bren gun controversy and his initiatives in organization.
Howe's views on conscription of manpower closely par­
alleled his policy of total conscription of all the wealth 
and power of the nation for war purposes. Manpower was a 
component part of those resources. If a war had to bo 
fought, it should be fought with all the resources of the 
nation at the disposal of the administration, and ended as 
soon as possible. Although King did not agree with Howe's 
views on conscription, he needed this man for his organ­
izational ability, and managed to modify Howe's Views 
until conscription became an absolute necessity in 1944.
One other Minister prominent in the immediate pre-war 
period was Ian MacKenzie, the personable Minister of Nat­
ional Defence until September 8, 1939« MacKenzie had ex­
ceptional popularity with the public, he was loyal in the 
extreme to King, he had unequalled knowledge of Parliamentary
2/Roberts, op. cit., p. 5^.
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procedure, and "volcanic energy" in debate.^^MacKenzie 
had, nevertheless, made several important mistakes in 
King's pre-war administration. He was not able to adequately 
defend the Ministry of National Defence in the Bren gun 
contract controversy, causing the government considerable 
trouble until rescued by C.D. Howe.
Since MacKenzie was hampered in the pre-war years by 
a lack of funds, it was inevitable that Canada entered the 
war poorly prepared. Even as late as 1938, when the Defence 
Minister pushed for larger expenditures for rearmament, 
pressure was still being exerted upon King to lower spending, 
as this letter from King to MacKenzie indicates:
"The present administration can make it clear to 
the people of Canada that it has, above all else, 
been cautious and prudent in all things, not only will 
its action be strongly approved by the citizens of 
Canada, but the position of Canada...will become more 
enviable than ever. A surplus of receipts over ex­
penditures and reduction in taxation are necessary to 
make this position a p p a r e n t ."29
The final decision to replace MacKenzie, nevertheless, 
came on September 15, 1939, when he delivered a speech de­
fending his performance in the pre-war years to the Cabinet 
which was described as "pathetic" by King.30 MacKenzie's 
performance in the pre-war years was adequate, but would
2%utchinson.The Incredible Canadian, op. cit., p. 216.
^%ing Papers, January 12, 1938, Vol. 253, PP* 216023-4.
30pickersgill, op. cit., p. 26. For a copy of this re­
port: King Papers, Vol. 272, pp. 230556-63.
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obviously not be spectacular under the stress of wartime 
expansion of the responsibilities of this vital Ministry.
Thus, MacKenzie was gazetted into the Department of Pensions 
and National Health for the war years.
By late 1939, as one author states. King had formed a 
team which made his other administrations look mediocre by 
contrast. It was perhaps the strongest, most dynamic and 
capable Ministry in modern Canadian history.31 Several of 
the members were of leadership calibre, (Rogers, Ralston 
and Dunning) many had great personal appeal, (Lapointe,
Power and MacKenzie) while others possessed great intell­
ectual and administrative ability. (Howe, Gardiner and Cardin) 
Perhaps the only cohesive factor which blended these power­
ful figures into a team was the power of their leader.
King was respected by all these men, and he used their 
divisions to strengthen his own position, and keep potential 
rivals arguing among themselves.32
The Cabinet, in Canadian experience, has varied in 
size from over twenty members to less than ten. MacKenzie 
King's Cabinet in 1939 consisted of only sixteen members, 
a small Cabinet, (Appendix J) more easily controlled than 
one of over twenty members. The Cabinet was formed, trad­
itionally, on a Federal, regional and racial basis, (alth­
ough somewhat heavy with Quebec members) with hetrogeneity
^^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 216. 
^^Ibid.. p. 9
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of interests allowing for more of an arbitration role 
for the Prime Minister,
The duties of the Cabinet were to direct and dissect 
public opinion, to maintain the party organization, to 
manage Parliament, and to supervise the details of govern­
ment. The primary function of this body was to determine 
the major lines of policy to be followed by the g o v e r n m e n t .33 
It was also the exclusive priviledge of Cabinet to introduce 
financial resolutions to the House of Commons, R.M. Dawson 
has summed up the powers of Cabinet precisely and in detail:
"The Cabinet links together the Governor-General 
and the Parliament. It is, for virtually all purposes, 
the real executive...The Cabinet is the servant of the 
Governor, yet in practice it tells him what to do; it 
is also the servant of the House of Commons, yet it 
leads and directs the House and is in a very real sense 
the master of that c h a m b e r ."34
The basic authority of Cabinet rested upon the support 
of the House of Commons. "The characteristic principle of 
Cabinet government is that the chief active heads should 
be in harmony with the House of Commons."35 The government 
party, the majority in the House of Commons, was expected, 
upon request, to vote in support of the Cabinet ana its 
policies, and generally to "support" the government. As 
H.McD. Clokie illustrates:
"Supporting' the government implies the passing of 
such legislation as is required for carrying out the 
administrative policy, approving financial measures 
required for the various services, and voting generally 
in defence of the Cabinet when it is attacked in a
33ciokie, op. cit., p. 168.
3^Dawson, op. cit., p. 197*
3^Clokie, op, cit., p. 131*
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partisan manner."36
Solidarity of the party in Canada rested upon a bond 
of personal loyalty to the leader, the authority of the 
party caucus, as well as potential material losses incurred 
by insurgency. This is, however, not to say that the 
House was considered a "rubber stamp" for all the policies 
of Cabinet. Although in the 1935-39 period the opposition 
parties were small, they still effectively fulfilled their 
role of criticism of government policy, and brought public 
issues into the forefront of Parliamentary debate. Although 
the initiative in terms of policy making was held by Cabinet, 
concurrence of the Governor General, the Senate and the House 
of Commons was necessary for Bills to be approved. "The 
concurrence of each is formally necessary for every legis­
lative act...There need be no doubt that the House of 
Commons is the real center of Parliamentary authority."37 
In contrast to the above quotation, the tendency to­
wards more Cabinet authority is evident as a war-time and 
post-war trend in Canadian politics, with the two distinct 
roles of the pre-war years (Executive and Legislative) 
being more closely drawn together, as R.M. Dawson ill­
ustrates:
"In Canada, where the Cabinet sits in Parliament 
and must be responsible to it, the co-operation be­
tween the two naturally goes much further and begins 
to approach the point where the one becomes merged in
36%bid.. p. 133. 
3?lbid.. p. 130.
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the other. From this develops a constant and no doubt 
an inevitable tendency for the Cabinet to push the 
House of Commons into the background and make the 
latter an approving and checking body which on only 
the rarest occasions will assert a genuine independ­
ence of its leader,"3°
Another factor which gave power to the^Iouse in the 
pre-war years was the fluctuation in Cabinet due to re­
organization. The implimentation of the Haldane Report 
of 1919 classifying services under ten different categories 
was still incomplete in 1939.39 This certainly, in terms 
of organization in the Cabinet, could well have temporarily 
enhanced the power of the House of Commons in the pre-war 
years.
The House of Commons, according to R.M. Dawson, is the 
"grand inquest of the nation", and it derives its power from 
being the only body which can withhold approval of govern­
ment policy, and because it is a body of representative 
character for the nation;
"It forms the indispensible part of the legis­
lature; and it is the body to which at all times 
the executive must turn for justification and
approval."40
MacKenzie King in the years before the war was often 
faced with strong opposition, but managed to persuade his 
party to support measures deemed by Cabinet to be for the
38Dawson, op. cit., p. 232
3^The Ten Areas of the Haldane Report: 1. Prime Minister 
and External Affairs. 2. Secretary of State, 3« Justice,
4. Finance, 5. Interior, 6. Defence, 7. Communications and 
Transport, 8. Production and Distribution, 9. Labour, and 
10. Public Works.
Clokie, op. cit., p. I76.
^^Dawson, op. cit., p. 357.
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good of the nation. King was a great believer in the party 
caucus. Although policy was not made in these sessions, 
(held weekly) Members were encouraged to attack or criticize 
Party policies. King usually gave the members reasons for 
particular policies and why they should support these dec­
isions of the Cabinet. Indirect criticism^of various dep­
artments by Members brought changes that King might other­
wise have had to push for himself.
Perhaps the outstanding example of this complex pro­
blem of party support was the Defence Appropriations debate 
of 1937. Rearmament was strongly criticized by both Cab­
inet, the Party caucus and Parliament, and King was forced 
to reduce defence estimates from fifty to thirty-five 
million dollars. This reduction was forced within the 
Cabinet as a reflection of both Parliamentary and public 
opinion on defence spending. Even then, the estimates 
came under severe criticism in Parliament, as the following 
quote illustrates:
"ll/hen the reduced estimates reached the House, 
the Government discovered that a majority of its own 
supporters opposed them, a few openly, the remainder 
privately. So hostile was the feeling that the Prime 
Minister summoned a special caucus, and is said to 
have told his followers that they would have tp vote 
for his estimates or accept the consequences."42
While party solidarity was at times precariously main­
tained, it solidified as a consciousness of the threat
^^Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 9<
^2"The Dominions and Imperial Defence", op. cit., p. 5*+7.
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from Europe was realized in the period after the Munich 
"settlement".^3 This problem was due in part to an ignorance 
on the part of the House as to details of foreign policy, 
since Cabinet did not reveal much information as to the 
nature of the international situation to either Parliament 
or the p u b l i c . ^
MacKenzie King often used the slogan "Parliament will 
decide", but made most important decisions by order-in- 
council without prior Parliamentary approval. He used the 
argument that Parliament was not versed in the technical 
knowledge needed to make complicated decisions, or that 
discussion in Parliament might upset delicate negotiations 
jeopardizing the future of Canada.
The relationship of foreign policy to Parliament is 
the topic of an excellent article by Kenneth HcNaught in 
which King's approach to the subject is explained:
"The Principle of parliamentary control of foreign 
policy was automatically accepted from the time of 
confederation, and in later years 'became a veritable 
dogma.' One recalls, also, the not infrequent ass­
ertions of the late V/.L. MacKenzie King that in major,, 
foreign policy commitments parliament would d e c i d e . "4 ^
McNaught concludes by stating that if "dogma" implies
providing Parliament with comparatively full information
and debate prior to major decisions being made as the
criterea by which the policy is to be measured, then that
"dogma" is a myth. But if the decision of the government
^3"Canada and the War Danger", op. cit., pp. 570-83* 
^4 b i d .. p. 570.
^^James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible (Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press, 19^1), pp." 107-8'.
McNaught, "Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy?" 
International Journal, (Autumn, 1956), p. 251.
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reflects the expression of parliamentary opinion, then the 
"dogma" is more reasonable.^7
This trend continued until by 1939 the functions of 
the House oi Commons in regards to criticism and the airing 
of public views in international affairs had been all but 
abrogated, with the overriding issue of the European war 
and the nature of Canadian participation becoming the chief 
concern of the House of Commons, still with no clear-cut 
decision by the Cabinet.
The strong support of the government in respect to 
the war, by the Conservative Party, the Social Credit 
movement and most of the C.C.F. members, as well as the 
r^ajority of the Liberal members all but stifled any anti­
war sentiments from being expressed in the House of Commons. 
Only a few members of the House actually spoke against 
war during the Special Session of Parliament in September 
1939, illustrating the almost unanimous support given to 
the Cabinet by the House.
The Upper House of Parliament, the Senate, took a 
back-seat role in the affairs of government decision-making 
with little power or influence in this area, especially in 
external affairs:
"The Senate has, therefore, nothing to do with the 
operation of the primary principle of ministerial res­
ponsibility. Usually, however, there is one Senator 
in the Cabinet, a minister without portfolio, whose , „ 
duty is to act as the government leader in the S e n a t e . "48
^ 7 i b i d . . p. 260. 
48Clokie, op. cit., p. 118.
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In the King Cabinet, Senator Dandurand ably represented 
the views of the Senate, as well as to fulfil the task of 
explaining governmental policy to that body. M. Dandurand 
also, on occasion, represented the government at internat­
ional conferences,
MacKenzie King had great respect for this leader who 
had supported him since his first administration in 1921 
with unquestionable loyalty. He was a valued member of the 
administration, although he often held views at odds with 
his chief. It was Dandurand who delivered the famous 
"fire-proof house" speech to the League of Nations and con­
tinued to hold isolationist views in the 1930's.
The power of the Senate was such that some influence 
y could be exerted upon the government, mainly through Dan­
durand, and the respect he commanded in the Cabinet as well 
as in Quebec. The Senate did not have the power to reject 
bills, but could, and frequently did, amend such legis­
lation.^® The Senate also had the power to promulgate 
limited legislation in the form of private b i l l s . O n e  
other important power of the Senate is aptly summed up by 
Senator Dandurand:
"Le role politique du Sénat est assez faible chez 
nous, surtout si on le compare aux Sénats araerican ou 
français. Les rares occasions qui lui lui ont été 
offertes de se prononcer à 1 'encontre des communes...
^%utchinson, op. cit., p. 96.
Government of Canada, Senate Journals, 1918, pp. 193-203- 
Dawson, op. cit., pp. 3^8-9.
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On répété sans cesse que le role du Sénat est
de protéger less minorités et de defendre les
droits des provinces.
Senators, however, were partisan politicians; "with 
but one or two possible exceptions, every new appointment 
has been made by the Prime Minister of the day from among
his political supporters."^3
Because of the influence of Party allegiance upon 
Senate membership, governments stocked this body with their 
supporters, and after extended periods in office completely 
dominated this body. The Senate also realized that "its
continual existence is dependent upon avoidance of a serious
clash with a determined government." Consequently, when 
the decision to enter World War II had to be made, no opp­
osition came from the Senate, both because of the strong 
determination of the government to go to war, and because 
the Senate was packed with Liberal supporters, and a minority 
of pro-war Conservatives who were certainly not averse to 
supporting the government pro-war stance. Thus, when the 
tine came for the decision to enter World War II, the Senate 
followed the example of the House of Commons and supported 
the government in its decision.
Part of the problem of the lack of information, both
1^0 / /
M. Hamlin, ed. Les Mémoires du Sénateur Raoul Dan­
durand (Québec City: Les Presses de L'Université Laval, '
1967)7 pp. 232-3.
^3ciokie, op. cit., p. 118.
^^Ibid.. p. 120.
55"canada and the War Danger", op. cit., p. 582.
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in the House of Commons and the Senate, on external affairs, 
stems from the guarded attitude of MacKenzie King towards 
Canadian foreign policy formulation. He preferred to work 
in secret, and maintained little contact with his Ministers 
in the field of foreign relations.5& One example of this 
policy reads as follows:
"No Cabinet colleague accompanied MacKenzie King 
on his visit to Hitler in the summer of 1937, and none 
could therefore challenge with an authority based on 
comparable experience and greviously inappropriate 
notions of Nazi policy and leadership that their 
Prime Minister has acquired on this mission."57
This was, however, the generally accepted p r a c t i c e ,
and it was not until 1946 that a bill was introduced in the
House of Commons to separate the Prime Minister from the
External Affairs portfolio. Suggestions were made, at
various times before the war to separate these two functions,
but King continued to refuse this separation. (Appendix I)
In 1939 the Department of External Affairs operated
^^Eayrs, op. cit., pp. 10-2
5?Ibid.. p. 11.
^ "In 1912, an amending act was passed placing the 
Department directly under the Prime Minister instead of 
the Secretary of State, and from April I of that year the 
Prime Minister held the additional portfolio of Secretary 
of State for External Affairs. The appointment of a sep­
arate minister for the Department was considered from time 
to time, but no action was taken until March 1946, when a 
bill was introduced to repeal the section of the act of 
1912 that provided that the Prime Minister was to be the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs."
Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, 
Reference Papers, (January, I969), No. 69, p. 1.
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with a very small staff, and only a few stations.59 However, 
in the Department of External Affairs, the Under-Secretary 
had a relatively more enhanced position than did his opposite 
numbers in other government departments, as this quote 
portrays:
"The Prime Minister in Canada is, ex-officio, the 
Minister for External Relations...in the Dominion it 
is an accepted practice that the Premier should fulfil 
the double duty of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 
For this reason the Deputy Minister for External 
Relations occupies a particularly important position 
in the Civil Service."
This author continues by comparing the power of the 
Department in terms of the shaping of policy in the external 
field. He explains that the Department has more influence 
in terras of policy-making because it is more concerned 
with questions of foreign policy than administration, im­
plying that whereas in other Departments, the power relat­
ionship starts at the apex and works downward through the 
mechanism of the Department, while in the Department of 
External Affairs policy more often comes from the lower 
levels and works up towards the apex. He qualifies this 
statement by stating that this trend is fairly accurate.
59canadian Diplomatic Representation to 1939
Washington 1927 Geneva 1925 (Permanent Representative
Paris 1928 to the League of Nations)
Tokyo 1929
Belgium 1939 Total staff in 1939: 32 officers.
Netherlands 1939
F.H. Coward, "The Department of External Affairs and 
Canadian Autonomy".Canadian Historical Association. No. 7, 
1965, pp. 12-5.
^®D. Marsh, Democracy at Work (Toronto: MacMillan Co.,
1938), p. 42.
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but within the bounds set down as government policy by 
Cabinet, and especially by the Prime Minister:
"...the making of ultimate decisions on foreign 
policy during the King administration was sometimes 
a unilateral act. But it is still important to stress 
that before such ultimate decisions were made by Mr. 
King, officials of the Department of External Affairs 
drew some of the problems to his attention, suggested 
policies or alternative courses of action, and then 
made some of the subsidiary decisions that followed 
from the policy determined by the Prime Minister.
Foreign service personnel were expected to carry out 
the policy of whatever government was in power, irrespective 
of personal beliefs, in terms of overall p o l i c y . c o n ­
tinuity of action, however, was lost in the pre-war years, 
because the top level of diplomats were also susceptible 
to the changes in domestic politics.
"A change of government nearly always meant, as 
it did in the United States diplomatic service, the 
automatic submission by the head of the mission of 
his resignation...The High Commissioner had been, in 
all essentials, simply the personal representative 
of the Prime Minister." 3
The head diplomatic service personnel in Ottawa were 
mainly connected with an advisory role, similar in many ways 
to the system of the United Kingdom. The role, however, 
was quite Important a^time did not allow the Prime Min­
ister to supervise closely the routine work of foreign
"Farrell, op. cit., pp. 11-2.
^^Marsh, op. cit., pp. 42-4.
^^Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto: 
MacMillan of Canada, 1963TI pT223^
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policy implimentation. This was an area supervised by the 
permanent officials of the Department, chief of which was 
O.D. Hkelton, the Under-Secretary for External Affairs from 
1925 until his death in 1941.
Skelton became a trusted and loyal ally of King in 1922 
when it became clear that the Prime Minister distrusted the 
members of the Department. King described this body as a 
"Tory hive"^^ln his diary, and Sice 1 ton was brought in to 
rebuild the Department on a non-partisan basis. His success 
can be measured by the fact that he remained Under-Secretary 
during the Bennett regime as well as under MacKenzie King.
By 1939, Skelton had become King's chief advisor and, it is 
claimed by several writers, that King's policies on Imp­
erial relations and Canadian autonomy, in the pre-war years, 
were shaped and defined by Skelton from 1922 onwards.
Skelton's views on foreign policy were so trusted that in 
1939 when Skelton argued for neutrality in the war against 
Germany, his views were not dismissed without due consider­
ation, although they clashed with those of King;
"Skelton argued that the surrenders and hypocrisy 
of appeasement from Ethiopia onwards, has undermined 
all the moral purposes for which the war ostensibly 
was being fought. Since no moral question was involved, 
Canada, like Ireland, should keep out. Being a North 
American nation, it might exercise some mediation in 
the course of a conflict morally chaotic."60
^^ayrs, op. cit., p. 6.
^^Ibid., p. 40., also Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 6. 
^^Ilutchinson, op. cit., p. 250.
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King argued with Skelton for two days In the crucial 
first week of September 1939 trying to convince him that 
Canada had no choice but to go to war at the side of Great 
Britain. Finally Skelton was convinced, and henceforth 
supported King to the hilt. As a result, however, King en­
tered the House on September 7 physically and mentally 
67exhausted.
Lorlng Christie, next to Skelton the most Important man 
in External Affairs argued for a policy of passive belliger­
ence. His attitude reflected a strong North American is­
olationist feeling, as this statement referring to Canada's 
possible commitments in a European war indicates;
"...there is for Canada no strategic necessity for 
rapid mobilization or other action,..To make it clear 
that Canada is not a participant in the same sense or 
on the same kind of unlimited scale as the European 
allies, but is only what for short may be called an 
'associate' - a North American associate..."&o
These attitudes were mirrored in much of the Department, 
but did not influence King's decision to enter World War II 
significantly. It was felt that the views of these men 
might be given greater weight if the position of Secretary 
of State for External Affairs was separated from the Prime 
Minister's office, giving External Affairs more of an in­
dependent voice at the Cabinet level.
This relationship of the Prime Minister to the External 
Affairs Department is well Illustrated in a reply by King
67Pickersgill, pp. cit., pp. 6-7.
^^Christie Papers, in Eayrs, op. cit., p. 4o (September
8, 1939)
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to a request for the separation of the Prime Minister’s 
office from that of External Affairs:
"The phases of the External Affairs work which re­
quire ny time are not the administrative features...
The tasks that require my time and thought are the 
broad questions of policy, to which both as Secretary 
of State for External Affairs and as Prime Minister 
I must give my attention."&9
The officers of the Department did not agree with this 
procedure, and thought King inadequate as a policy maker. 
Department officials wanted Canada to take a far more active 
role in external affairs, but were hampered by the cautious 
policy of the Prime Minister and his desire to avoid commit­
ments overseas. One External Affairs officer, Mr. Hume 
Wrong, reflected upon Canada's role at one 1937 conference 
at which he represented Canada:
"We should not be here at all, as our instructions 
should be summarised as: say nothing and do nothing
unless you can undo something of what was done at Gen­
eva...Dining alone this evening I developed a plan for 
the perfect representative of Canada at Conferences.
Our delegate would have a name, even a photograph; a 
distinguished record, an actual secretary - but he 
would have no corporeal existence and no one would 
even notice that he was not there."70
In the department there was certainly a desire for
diplomacy to be left to the diplomats unhampered by the
Prime Minister. This impression was surely accurate in the
planning of long-term objectives. MacKenzie King treated
foreign policy decisions on a day-to-day basis, with no
69%ing Papers, Vol 271, July 24, 1939, p. 2293^5. 
7®Massey, op. cit., pp. 234-5.
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long terra plans beyond the need to maintain national unity, 
and (until 1939) to keep Canada uncommitted in foreign 
affairs. As one writer describes these ad hoc arrangements:
"He could not bring himself to face the prospect of 
war or the resulting division of Canada...Canada still 
had no policy, only the negation of all policy in King's 
repeated, fatuous assurance that Parliament would de­
cide everything, without any advanced commitments, at 
the proper time."71
Even in less important situations King made decisions 
based upon the strength of the perceived requirements of 
the day, not upon a deep analysis of the issues involved 
for the future. As King stated in his diary after the 
working out of the Hyde Park Agreement, " I recall what 
Lord Morley said about not planning too far ahead in pol­
itics. That events determine what is p o s s i b l e . "?2
Long terra planning was, and still is, weaker than the 
ordinary day-to-day decision-making process. The limited 
number of experts in both area and functional studies 
forced the Department to use its manpower (32 officers in
1939) on short term operations leaving little time for 
long term projects. Thus, many emergencies arose through 
a lack of contingency planning, and had to be solved quickly 
with little forethought.
Before 1939, planning of any kind in international 
affairs was limited by the lack of an Intelligence gathering
7%utchinson, ?^ r. Prime Minister, op. cit., p. 260. 
T^King Diary, in Eayrs, op. cit., p. 155.
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apparatus. By 1939, Canada had diplomatic missions in only 
one of the three Axis capitals. The Minister to Japan,
Herbert Marier, was a political appointee, with a strong 
affection and sympathy for Japan. He was extremely sus­
ceptible to Japanese propaganda, and furnished the govern­
ment with little concrete information. In the Eino-Japanese 
war. King was unable to make any statement or comment because; 
"...the slight knowledge that we possess.' suggests that 
the intelligence they contained was neither extensive nor 
important."73
Canada had no diplomatic representation in either Italy 
or Germany and had to rely extensively upon the British 
foreign service reports provided through the Office of Dom­
inion Affairs. (Fairly accurate appraisals of European 
conditions, but with few predictive qualities.)
The Canadian representative in Paris, M. Philippe Roy, 
was a strong Germanophone, and lauded the achievements of 
Hitler's regime. Canada's High Commissioner in London,
Vincent Massey, spent most of his time in British government 
circles, and learned little not already provided by the Dom­
inion Office.7^ Massey also had a propensity to blame 
"French vindictiveness" for the situation created in E u r o p e . 75
To compound the intelligence failure. King, after his
73lbid.. p. 135.
7^Ibid.. pp. 135-6.
^^Massey, op. cit., pp. 229-31,
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visit to Hitler in 1937, felt that war would not come to 
Europe. He saw Hitler as a reasonable man, and Chamber­
lain's policy of appeasement to be just, equitable, and 
entirely suited to the European situation. As James Eayrs 
states, "speculative-evaluative intelligence" was what was 
needed for the Prime Minister to properly judge the European 
situation. This data, Canada did not have.7&
Even the sparce information received was not considered 
seriously by the Prime Minister. The best information 
received, quite definitely, was from British situation 
reports delivered through the Dominion Office to the Dep­
artment of External Affairs in Ottawa. King's distrust of 
the British and their reports was noted by Vincent Massey, 
in his diary. (June 17,1937)
"His King'^point of view in this matter seemed 
to reflect an anti-British bias (one of the most power­
ful factors in his make-up) extreme egoism and a very 
definite lack of confidence in my own ability to with­
stand what he would regard as sinister British influ­
ences,"77
An incident is related by Lester Pearson (then first 
Secretary at the High Commission in London) which further 
shows the lack of faith King had in British sources. Pearson 
related that he was home on leave from London in the summer 
of 1939 when he saw a newspaper headline, "Nazis threaten 
Danzig and the Polish Corridor." Pearson went directly to 
King and proposed that war was imminent. King thought
7&Eayrs, op. cit., p. 136. 
^^Massey, op. cit., p. 2^ -2.
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Pearson's judgement unsound (supported by Skelton) and that 
he was overly alarmed. Pearson suggested that he cut short 
his leave and Immediately fly back to London, (then a risky 
venture) King felt Pearson was "positively panicky" but 
Pearson, nevertheless, did fly back to London, and arrived 
a week before war was d e c l a r e d .
In fact, contrary to the above indication, King did have 
access to information, at the time of the Interview mentioned 
above, that Poland was to be invaded, and the approximate 
date. This information was in the hands of the Prime Min­
ister by June 20, 1939, from K.P. Kirkwood, the Canadian 
representative to the Netherlands. Kirkwood had been in 
touch with a German diplomat, Herr zu Putlitz on March 11, 
1939 aod had been told of the projected German Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia on June 20, 1939*
"Herr zu Putlitz now expresses his belief that a 
new German'incident' directed against Poland will 
take place on or about Aug. 20th, though in what pre­
cise form he does not commit himself."/9
Kirkwood's report continued with information about
Germany provoking an attack by Poland and then taking
"defensive action" to crush Poland. Zu Putlitz felt that
the allies would not take military action in support of
BoPoland, The only answer to why King did not act upon
7 L. Pearson, "Forty Years On: Reflections on Our
Foreign Policy", International Journal. (Summer, 196?), 
pp. 35^-60.
fixing Papers, June 20, 1939, Vol. 270, p. 228801. 
GOlbld.
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this report either center upon a suspicion about the acc­
uracy of Kirkwoods interview, or that King did not read 
this particular piece of information, although it was 
delivered to his office.
The failure by King to use the External Affairs Dep­
artment, its resources and personnel to greater advantage, 
and to exclude Parliament, most of the Cabinet, his advis­
ors, and the public from foreign affairs deliberations 
precluded the thought of any effective opposition to King's 
views.
As an overview it is safe to say that the traditional 
checks and balances of the Canadian political system ceased 
to function in maximum detail during the September 1939 
crisis. Whatever power the Senate and the Governor-General 
possessed was not utilized in the form of effective crit­
icism or even analysis of the possibilities or probabilities 
of the particular courses of action that could have been 
adopted due partly to this lack of information on foreign 
affairs.
The House of Commons likewise abrogated its role as 
the critic of government policy, and as the body by which 
public issues were aired. The opposition parties were es­
pecially lax ?it his time. On the Cabinet level, there was 
little opposition to King's policies, although the attitudes 
of individual members of that body are known, and have 
been described in some detail within this section.
What has become clear is that the indecision before
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the war was basically the result of King's policies in 
external affairs. The decision to enter World War II was 
based as much upon what King considered to be the import­
ant obligations to be considered for the good of Canada, 
as upon the dogma that "Parliament would decide,"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER If
The Decision; September 1 to 10, 1939 
A. External Relations and Public Reaction.
This chapter will focus upon the external pressures 
exerted upon the Canadian government in the crucial weeks 
prior to the commencement of hostilities against Germany, 
and the effects of these pressures upon public opinion and 
government policies. Chief of these pressures were the 
signing of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact and the in­
vasion of Poland by Germany, The reaction overseas to the 
Canadian decision not to declare war simultaneously with 
the United Kingdom will also be discussed in this section 
of the paper, primarily in regards to German and American 
reactions.
The British reaction to the separate declaration will 
be handled in a third part of this chapter, specifically in 
relation to military co-operation between Canada and Britain 
as an extention of pre-war interaction. The effect of the 
Royal Visit to Canada in 1939 will also be examined as a 
factor in Canadian-British relations in this crucial period. 
Also discussed in this section will be some of the possible 
reasons for the delay in declaring war against Germany, as 
well as some of the official reasons espoused by the King 
government.
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It is the contention of several authors that the signing 
of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact on August 21, 1939 
was the key event which signalled the death-knell of Mac- 
Kenzie King's non-involvement appeasement policy.^ This 
event was seen as an alliance of dictators determined to 
conquer the democracies, and with ideological differences 
swept aside to facilitate the process. This was something 
that Ernest Lapointe dreaded, an alliance of Nazi's and Co­
mmunists.
The non-aggression Pact precipitated in Canada a hasty 
series of contingency measures. On August 21 the Canadian 
Navy was mobilized, equipped for sea duty, and naval res­
ervists were called up.^ An office of Dominion Affairs 
communique to the Department of External Affairs on August 
23 reported; "Military concentration is now in progress; 
large scale troop movements being reported from Berlin and 
Vienna in the direction of Pomerania, Silesia and Slovakia."3
On the same day, Polish troops moved westward, and 
both France and Britain began mobilization. King proclaimed 
the War Measures Act in conjunction with the previous events 
admitting that a state of "apprehended war" now existed.
On August 2k- the British Parliament convened in Special
^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 2^8. 
^King Papers, Vol. 272, p. 230! 
3lbid.. Vol. 279, p. 23569^.
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Session to discuss war measures. Canadian Armed Forces 
were geared for hostilities, and Naval Signals Stations 
were equipped for war. Also;
"Towards the later part of August the international 
situation became so acute that it was apparent that war 
might break out any day. The government accordingly 
initiated certain precautionary measures of defence, 
the plans for which had previously been perfected."^
A speedup in arms delivery from the United States with 
additional orders of up to fifty aircraft were ordered. On 
August 25, 800 reservists were called up, and on the next 
day, all Militia units were mobilized, 15,000 being used to 
man coastal defences and guard vunerable points of national 
importance. At the same time, all shipping in Canadian wa­
ters was brought under Naval control. In the last week of 
August, squadrons of the R.C.A.F. were moved to the Atlantic 
coast and placed at full combat alert.^ The Array called for 
volunteers, and was overwhelmed by thousands of World War 
I veterans, as well as large numbers of younger enthusiasts.
Even at this point. King was not fully committed to a 
war policy. He realised that, due to the pressure of public 
opinion which had solidified after the Munich crisis, his 
government would fall unless Canada supported Great Britain. 
The Cabinet was unanimous upon this policy, and upon the 
fact that Hitler was the aggressor and would have to be 
stopped by the use of force.& At the same time. King did 
not give up hope for a peaceful solution, although even he
^Ibid.. Vol. 272, p. 230577. 
5lbid.
6lbid., p. 230579.
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realized by this time that Hitler could not be trusted to 
keep his promises. King sent telegrams to the Heads of 
State of Poland, Germany and Italy urging moderation, and 
a peaceful solution to the problem. Hitler did not answer 
the request, and the Polish Ministers saw themselves as the 
aggrieved party, with the responsibility for compromise in 
the hand of Germany.? King's last attempt at appeasement 
was completely unsuccessful. On September I, Poland was 
invaded by German mechanized troops.
On September I, the Canadian government was moved to 
take concrete action in response to German moves:
"On September 1st, when Germany actually invaded 
Poland, the Government declared the existence of a 
state of apprehended war as and from August 25th, On 
this day the formation of a Canadian Active Service 
Force of two divisions was authorized under Section 
6lf of the Militia Act."8
R.C.A.F. units based on the Atlantic coast were ordered 
to patrol offshore waters, and when Britain declared war 
on September 3, Canadian Naval units were ordered "to de­
fend themselves if attacked". On September 4, a scheme for 
the internment of aliens was set up, followed by the est- 
ablisment of a Prize Court on September 5.^ Thus, by Sept­
ember 7, Canada was at war except by the strictest inter­
pretation of international law, in that no declaration of 
war had been issued. The public could see that war was
7
G.P. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External 
Relations (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, I966), II, p. I30.
%ing Papers, op. cit.. Vol. 272, p. 230579*
^Ibid., p. 230580.
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inevitable, and that the Axis powers were the aggressors; 
Britain was at war, and the majority of Canadians supported 
this decision.
The period from September 3, (The Declaration of war 
by Britain) and September 10, (The Canadian declaration of 
war) needs to be examined more closely. During this period 
Canada was, technically speaking, neutral, although perhaps 
"actively neutral" might be a more accurate term due to the 
close relations maintained with Britain. Canada certainly 
could not meet the requirements for neutral status as 
Ernest Lapointe understood them:
"Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of im­
partiality adopted by a third state towards belliger­
ents and recognized by belligerents, such attitudes 
creating rights and duties between the impartial 
state and the belligerent s. " H
The policy of the German Reich, in regards to Canadian 
neutrality, is somewhat complex. In a letter to King, the 
German Consul General in Ottawa, E. Nindels, recognized Can­
ada’s neutrality and the inevitability of Canada joining 
with Britain in the struggle against Germany.
"As for Canada, which appears under your leadership, 
Mr. Prime Minister, to be resolved to enter this war 
against Germany, no dialectics will succeed in abolish­
ing the fact that Canada has never been threatened by 
Germany...On the other hand, Germany is to be attacked 
by Canada...! am convinced that your government is 
resolved to embroil a whole people, against its will 
and unconsulted, in a terrible war, under the pretense 
of fighting for the freedom of mankind."
^^Hutchinson, op. cit. p. 24^.
^^Riddell, op. cit., p. 238.
^^King Papers, September 4, 1939, Vol 282, pp. 2385IO-3,
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Windels continued by paraphrasing a French-Canadian 
journal, L'Illustration Nouvelle, which used the argument 
that King had no mandate from the people to go to war, 
since the last election was held in 1935, and a plebisite 
should be held to decide on participation in the war. 
However, it seems fairly certain that the Germans misjudged 
public opinion, as at this particular juncture the majority 
of Canadians would have voted to go to war, and it is upon 
this assumption that King made his decision. King had a 
fairly good idea of what the response to a referendum or 
election would be, especially in Quebec, where perhaps the 
majority would be against war. If this fact were to appear 
in public, national unity could have been lost, to the det­
riment of Canada's future war effort.
There were references in the German Press to Canadian 
violations of neutral status, validating Germany's stand in 
relation to Canada. By criticizing these "violations" the 
implication was that Canada was indeed seen by Nazi Germany 
as a neutral. One specific violation charged that aircraft 
were being funnelled through Canada from the United States 
for the R.A.F. at a time when Canada was supposed to be 
n e u t r a l , a  claim that was subsequently disproved.
The recognition of Canadian neutrality was undoubtedly 
used by Germany for propaganda purposes to illustrate the 
rifts in the Western camp. One example is a radio broadcast
13lbid.. pp. 238512-3. 
l^lbid.. Vol 272, p. 230444.
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by Peutschlaadsender in Polish, on September 6; "Canada 
declared that war In Europe is not her war and would remain 
neutral," Similar broadcasts were transmitted by Zessen to 
the Far East illustrating the isolationist tendencies in 
French C a n a d a . ^5 These broadcasts were meant to show Poland 
and the world that Canada would not be aiding the allies.
The propaganda value of Canadian neutrality was not the 
only reason for Germany hoping Canada would remain neutral. 
Canada, in the First World War had made a sizeable impression 
upon German military l e a d e r s . W i t h  the military balance 
between Germany and the allies so close, a few Canadian 
divisions might have been a significant force.
The question of Canada's relations with Germany was 
further complicated by the sinking of the Athenia by a German 
submarine. Several hundred Canadians were aboard, many of 
whom died in the disaster. At this point impartial neutral­
ity as a long-term policy became unacceptable to the Can­
adian government and people.
The reaction of the United States, in relation to Can­
ada's status became extremely important to the Dominion.
The United States Neutrality Laws forbade selling military 
supplies to any belligerent. At the outset of the war (Sept­
ember 3) Roosevelt's advisors were unclear as to the status 
of Canada, and worked under the assumption that when Britain 
was at war, the whole Empire and Commonwealth, including
l5ibid.. Vol. 272, p. 230461.
^^L.F. Hannon, Ça 
Stewart, 1968), p. 70.
C nada at War (Toronto: McClelland &
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Canada was at war. The President telephoned King in Ottawa 
on the 5th asking him if this was the case. King replied 
in the negative,^"^and Canada was not recognized as a part­
icipant.^® Canada continued to import military supplies 
until the Declaration of war was delivered on September 10.
In fact, a flight of planes being delivered to Canada was 
stopped en route just before they crossed the United States'
border*^9
Another incident which emphasized the United States' 
recognition of Canadian neutrality occurred in the week under 
question. On September 3, three Canadian fighter aircraft 
flying from Ontario to Halifax were grounded at a Maine air­
port for repairs. United States Customs officials impounded 
the aircraft and crews after the twenty-four hour deadline, 
until Roosevelt confirmed Canada's neutral status, and the 
aircraft were released. Other Canadian Armed Forces units 
were allowed to pass through Maine in the week of neutrality.^0
Another incident which illustrates the Canadian desire
l^Hardy, op. cit., p. 176,
-I Q
The U.S. Ammended Proclamation of Neutrality: Sept.6.
"A proclamation by the President of the United States 
of America proclaiming the neutrality of the United States 
in the war between Germany and France; Poland; and the 
United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand."
King Papers, p. 232175.
^^Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, op. cit., II, 186.
PO
J.E. Read,"Problems of an External Affairs Legal 
Advisor 1928 to 1946", International Journal Vol. XXII, 
(Summer, 1967), pp. 390-1.
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to be recognized as neutral occurred when the Australian 
government was recognized as a belligerent on September 5* 
The Australian government had ordered planes In the United 
States but could not now receive them due to the United 
States' Neutrality Laws. They requested that Canadian 
officials take delivery of the aircraft, and send them on
to Australia. The Canadian government refused, accentuating
20the desire for recognition as a neutral.
To reiterate, a declaration of neutrality by a nation 
means very little unless that status Is recognized by the 
countries of primary Importance to the nation making the 
declaration. In this particular Instance, Germany did 
everything In Its power, short of stopping the invasion of 
Poland, to keep Canada neutral. (The United States, after 
Initial Indecision, recognized Canada as neutral, and all­
owed military supplies to cross the International border. 
This policy on the part of the United States may have been 
Influenced by the bond of friendship between King and 
Roosevelt, as well as to maintain North American solidarity 
In the face of European d i s o r d e r .21 The possibility of 
Canada remaining neutral in a British war was settled by
po
the recognition afforded by these two nations.^
The major area of contention, in terms of Canadian 
neutrality, in this period, was the close relationship of
20Eayrs, op. cit., p. 186.
^^C.P. Stacey. Arms. Men and Governments (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 1970), p. 9d.
22Read, op. cit., pp. 390-1.
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Canada to the United Kingdom. If any claim could have been 
made by Germany to dispute Canada's neutral status, it 
would center upon this interaction.
In the military sphere, co-operation was close between 
the two nations almost from the start, as this letter from 
the Department of External Affairs to Vincent Massey in 
London indicates;
"In view of the fact that Parliament is to meet 
on Thursday and that we are in communication with the 
Government of the United Kingdom as to appropriate 
methods of military co-operation..."23
The "liaison Letters" exchanging military information 
between London and Ottawa included material of a top-secret 
nature informing the British and Canadian defence staffs of 
each others defence standing and future planning.2^ These 
exchanges had continued since I909, and had not been termin­
ated at the time of Britain's declaration of war.
A few Canadian officers were in training in Britain, 
and several British officers were serving in the Canadian 
forces. One Royal Navy officer served as Director of Naval 
Intelligence and Plans. This office was considered by the 
British to be part of the world-wide Admiralty Intelligence 
System, and continued to supply information to Britain 
during the week of neutrality and afterwards.
In the week of neutrality, two British cruisers were 
based on Halifax, with the approval of the Canadian government,
^^King Papers, p. 232175*
pif
McNaughton Papers, "Canadian Air Liaison Papers", 
No. I, 1935, p. 301.
25Stacey, op. cit., p. 80.
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In the same week, discussions took place over British 
mobilization of several colliers.under British registry but 
on Canadian charter. The Department of External Affairs 
replied with a request that these ships not be taken out of 
service as "Canadian defensive and war preparations Involving 
production and transportation of supplies both for Canada 
and the United Kingdom will be seriously handicapped..
By the time the Canadian government met In Special 
Session to decide on Canada's status, Canadian naval units 
were already co-operating with British ships In the escorting 
of convoys, and the protection of ports along the Atlantic 
coast.27 Canadian seamen were serving In the Royal Navy, 
and the Commonwealth Air Training Plan was starting operat­
ions to train British pilots for the R.A.F. In Canada.
The official British attitude towards Canadian neutrality 
was somewhat contradictory. In the British declaration of 
war, Canada was not committed. In fact, the terms of the 
declarations and statements between Britain and Germany 
used the term "Els Majesty.'s . Government In the United 
Klngdom"28 clearly leaving the Dominions to decide for them­
selves. On the other hand, when Neville Chamberlain add­
ressed Parliament on September I, he declared, "Nd shall 
enter it with a clear conscience with the support of the
2^klng Papers, p. 232175.
27
Hardy, dp. cit., p. 179.
28
J.W. Gnntenbeln, ed. Documentary Background^to World 
War II . 1931-41 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 19^ 4831 
ppJ"4o4%10.
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Dominions and the British Empire..."29
All the while, close military liaison was being main­
tained. This is in part due to the cleavage of opinion 
between the government and the military. The Prime Minister 
and the Department of External Affairs viewed this problem 
in non-military terms, while the military leaders saw the 
inevitability of war, with Canada at Britain's side, and a 
necessity for joint planning in advance of such a war as 
not only common sense, but desirable militarily.30
On the other hand, Canada made no effort to declare 
her neutrality, publicly to the world or privately to 
Britain. In fact, the opposite occurred. On September 3,
King wrote to Chamberlain asking what Canada could do to 
help Britain. Chamberlain replied, "Men, money and materiel". 
The Canadian government did all it could to supply what was 
needed.3^As King described this policy:
"When war appeared inevitable, Parliament was 
instantly summoned. Canada, forthwith, by the dec­
ision of her Parliament, took her place at the side 
of the Allies. In anticipation of Parliament's de­
cision, we had already begun direct and daily con­
sultation with Britain."32
Part of this co-operation involved the incarceration 
of German diplomats in Britain, pending the release of 
United Kingdom consular officials. Britain placed rest­
rictions on Consular officers of Germany in the Empire, 
and asked Canada to co-operate by holding the diplomatic
^^King Papers, Vol. 279, p. 235845 
30Stacey, op. cit., p. 99.
IIEayrs, op. cit., p. 103.
32King, Canada and the War, op. cit., p. 21.
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staffs resident in Ottawa. This request came on September 
8, and the action upon German diplomatic personnel was 
not decided upon before Canada issued her own declaration
of war.33
An additional factor which caused this close relation­
ship to develop was the Royal Visit of 1939. The visit of 
the King and Queen to Canada in June helped solidify re­
lations between the two nations. King recorded in his diary 
on August 26, 1939, a talk he had with the Governor Gen­
eral, Lord Tweedsmuir;
"I told him that the King's visit had helped imm­
ensely re-uniting Canada for the crisis that last 
September I would not have had a united Cabinet...
Today I had all united on our participation if there 
were an act of aggression which brought England and 
France into a war with Germany."34
The great success of this tour strengthened the bonds 
of loyalty to the Royal Family, subsequently drawing public 
opinion towards Great Britain and the support of Britain's 
Monarch. Vincent Massey recounts a conversation he had with 
an English friend during the war who had picked up a Can­
adian soldier. When asked why he had come so far to fight, 
the soldier replied, "I saw the Queen when she was in Canada 
and I said if there is ever a war. I'm going to fight for 
that little lady."3^ Certainly the emotional attachment for 
the Monarchy and the affinity for the United Kingdom was
33ying papers. Vol. 279, pp. 23594-1-3.
35,
i4King Diary, in Stacey, op. cit., p. 7.
Massey, op. cit., pp. 276-7.
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strengthened by this visit.
A more concrete strategic problem which needed joint 
planning in the crucial week of neutrality was the defence 
of Newfoundland, a British Crown Colony, which had no local 
defences, and relied for its protection on the might of the 
Royal Navy. Britain had no contingency plans for the gar- 
isoning of the Island, or the coast of Labrador, since 
Newfoundland was not of strategic importance to Britain in 
a European war. The pre-war British plans (July, 1938) 
showed a need for small naval units (6 aux. minesweepers,
3 anti-submarine vessels) and an air squadron. The British 
communique continued by stating;
"No squadron of the peacetime Royal Air Force, 
however, is earmarked for this purpose and in order 
to carry out the above plans the necessary squadron 
would either have to be raised as a new unit in the 
United Kingdom after the outbreak of war or be provided 
from some other source in the British Commonwealth."3°
The implications drawn from this statement by the Can­
adian government was that she would have to provide the nec­
essary defences for Newfoundland, and these forces were ear­
marked in December 1938.®^ Again, Canada had little choice 
in this instance, since although Newfoundland was of low 
priority in Britain's defence structure, it was of crucial 
strategic importance to Canada. Naval and air units of an 
enemy based upon this island could sever Canada's trade and 
communications with Britain. Also the Nova Scotia Steel 
industry was dependent upon Newfoundland iron ore.
36 
'ibid.
Stacey, op. cit., p. 93» 
37,
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By 1939, Britain had handed over all the defence re­
sponsibilities of this Crown Colony to Canada. The Canadians, 
as this statement by King indicates, did not protest this 
arrangement:
"The British government told us that we could render 
the greatest help by assisting in the naval and air 
defence of Newfoundland, Labrador, the French islands 
in the Gulf, and the British and French West Indies.
We provided that assistance at o n c e ."38
However reluctantly, Canada was forced to co-operate
with Great Britain in the defence of this vital region,
especially in the week of neutrality when British interests
were directed elsewhere.
Causing further confusion in these several weeks of
negotiations were the constitutional factors involving
Canadian sovereignty. The question became one of whether
or not Canada was formally independent of Great Britain, and
crossed the whole spectrum of public opinion, as well as
causing rifts within the government. MacKenzie King, for
example, believed that Canada was completely independent
of Great Britain. Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice,
on the other hand, believed that neutrality was impossible
for Canada, and when Britain was at war, Canada was at war.
By 1939, King had made several statements making it
clear that under his leadership, Canada would not go to war
automatically, but would do so only with the support and
consent of Parliament.3^ King made this clear to the British
33King, Canada and the War, op, cit., p. 25. 
3%iddell, op. cit., pp. 173-205.
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In the pre-war period, as well as during the war, as this 
speech in London indicates:
"Ours was not an automatic response to some mech­
anical organization of Empire, Canada's entry into 
war was the deliberate decision of a free people, by 
their own representatives in a free Parliament."40
However, in the pre-war years, the validity of this 
policy stated by King was seriously questioned. In 1937 
after his visit to Hitler, King affirmed that his government 
would stand behind Britain if a European war broke out.^^ 
Statements such as these, fortified by the Justice Minister's 
belief that Canada was legally bound by a British declar­
ation, under the old Laurier f o r m u l a , 42 did much to create 
uncertainty in the minds of Canadians.
There are a number of interpretations as to why Canada 
remained neutral when Great Britain had declared war, chief 
of which was to disprove the belief that Canada could not 
make a separate declaration of war, and reinforce Canadian 
independence in the eyes of the world and the Canadian people. 
Under King, Canada had gradually won free and complete inde­
pendence of action in foreign affairs. King was not to lose 
the opportunity to affirm independence:
"...King had not led his country up the rocky, uncertain 
slope towards complete self-government to overlook now 
this golden opportunity to proclaim to the world Can­
ada' s state of complete and uninhibited nationhood."^3
4%lng, op. cit., p. 7.
^^Glazebrook, op. cit., p. 126.
42%. MacNaught, "The 1930'", in Careless and Brown, 
op. cit., p. 272.
^®Hardy, op. cit., p. 175.
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Certainly this factor was quoted extensively during and 
after the war as the primary reason for Canada's delay in 
declaring war. However, other factors were involved. The 
legal "casus belli" for Britain was the violation of Polish 
territory which the British, under treaty were pledged to 
protect. The Canadian government did not have a defence 
treaty with Poland, so nebulous humanistic, idealistic argu­
ments were used, or the argument that Canada would be next 
in line if Britain were defeated. The fact that Parliament 
was not in session, but by King's promises, would have to 
decide, slowed down the formal decision-making process until 
a Session could be called. However, this was just a formal 
manifestation of a decision implimented already. Before Brit­
ain declared war, Canada had given notice of her intentions:
"... the action taken by the /"Canadian_/ government 
on Sept. I, when availing itself of the authority 
granted under the War Measures Act of 1914, it pro­
claimed a state of 'apprehended w a r . " ^ 4
The expressed reason for this action before the decision
of Parliament was "to avoid any possible prejudice by reason
41of the few day's delay in declaring war."  ^King also pre­
supposed that Parliament and the people would support his 
initiatives; a fairly safe premise.
A second argument put forward by a number of authors 
to explain Canadian neutrality was the need to utilize the 
United States' defence industry for as long as possible.
^ Ibid.. p. 175.
45
Read, op. cit., p. 390.
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Neutral status on the part of Canada would mean the United 
States' Neutrality Laws would not apply, and Canada could 
buy military hardware from the United States.46 Official 
government statements also put forward this argument;
"There was some remark on the length of time taken 
for Canada to make this formal declaration...the delay 
was actually of great service to the British and Allied 
cause, for, until the formal declaration of war by 
Canada, the United States Neutrality Law was not evoked 
against this country."^7
This argument, however, has little validity as a con­
scious policy by the Canadian government. Certainly, some 
military supplies were sent to Canada in the week that Can­
ada was recognized as neutral, but their overall value to 
the allied cause was negligible at this stage.
The R.C.A.F. purchasing mission only arrived in Wash­
ington to start negotiations for the military on August 26, 
1939, a week before the invasion of Poland. This equipment 
amounted to thirty-five aircraft and some electronic equip­
ment, at a cost of less than $7.5 Million. The aircraft 
were not delivered, as Canada was at war before they could 
cross the border. An inventory was not kept of what was re­
ceived, and since the major purchase (aircraft) could not 
be delivered, the equipment sent could not have been of 
substantial value.48 King, owing to the lateness in sending
^®Ibid.. p. 390.
^^King Papers, Vol. 2?2, p. 230581. 
Eayrs, op. cit., pp. 184— 6.
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the mission, and the small amount of money provided, could 
not have seen this as a concrete reason to delay declaring 
war.
To plan ahead under the assumption that the United 
States would recognize Canadian neutrality, would have been 
a tenuous arrangement at best, with Canada obviously engaged 
in close joint planning with Great Britain. In fact, indic­
ations given to the United States could have given the opp­
osite impression. On September 2, a request from the Dep­
artment of External Affairs, parallel to that of Great Britain, 
to Cordell Hull in Washington gave the impression that Canada 
was on the verge of declaring war along with Great Britain:
"I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian 
Government would appreciate it, should the Government 
of the United States accept the undertaking requested 
by His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, if this pro­
tection could be accorded to Canadian nationals."4-9
Also there was no indication that any of the equipment
was transhipped to Great Britain to strengthen Allied defences
directly against Germany. Thus, dispite official statements
to the contrary, the effect of countervening the United
States Neutrality Law was incidental to the main argument
of asserting Canada's independence from Great Britain.
King, to show that Canada was entirely independent of
Great Britain, emphasized this delay in declaring war by
not updating the declaration to coincide with that of
Britain. Australia and New Zealand did not pass declarations
^%ing Papers, Vol. 272, p. 230570.
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Vof war until September 4, but they updated their declarat­
ions to the same time as that of Great Britain. Canada 
could have done the same, but for nationalistic reasons, 
the date had to be different. To update the decision 
would not have compromised Canada's position vis-a-vis the 
United States in terms of acquiring military supplies.
Long-term planning, with every ounce of military hardware 
a valuable possession, which the above policy suggests, was 
not conceived in 1939, when it was thought that the war 
would be of short duration. Besides the few rather neb­
ulous threats in the pre-war years, the Canadian government 
and military saw no reason to believe that either Western 
Europe or Canada were seriously threatened by the Axis.50 
It was only after the fall of France and the commencement 
of the Battle of Britain that King worked out a comprehensive 
war plan, and his "northern bridge" theory.5^ Thus, no ser­
ious consequences were envisioned to the allied cause by 
Canada's initial week of formal neutrality. Also, this week 
provided a useful precedent for future threats to Canadian 
independence.
50King Papers, Vol. 221, pp. 189987-190002.
^^King described the North Atlantic Region as a bridge 
starting at Great Britain, including Iceland, Greenland, and 
Newfoundland as stepping stones to Canada. In 1939 traffic 
moved eastward over the bridge, but could move the other way:
"We know it is not enough to garrison the bridge 
itself, unless we are prepared to defend this island 
2  Brltain_y which is its eastern bridgehead. That is 
why the fighting men of Canada are here in growing 
numbers to share the task which is our defence as well 
as yours."
King, op. cit., p. 11.
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B. Analysis of the Special Session of Parliament
For most Canadians, during the crisis of 1939 there 
was little question as to what Canada's ultimate decision 
would be. Participation in the war was seen as inevitable 
with most Canadians supporting this view. In this instance, 
precedents were available to enable the government to di­
ssect public opinion and predict the mood of Parliament.
One precedent comes immediately to the fore. After 
the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, it seemed for a 
short while that Britain might go to war with Italy. The 
Canadian government put all forces upon a state of readiness, 
and announced publicly that this alert was only a routine 
check, so the public would not be unduly alarmed. General 
McNaughton, the Canadian Chief of the General Staff, predicted 
a situation involving an emotional response to a British 
appeal similar to that seen in World War I:
"McNaughton thought that if an attack were made on 
British shipping or the base at Alexandria, 'the sent­
iment in Canada would be similar to 1914'^and demand 
government action in support of Britain.
Such a policy was not in line with the policies that 
MacKenzie King had fought for in the inter-war years. He 
resisted this call to empire as he would do in 1939»
Close military co-operation with Britain involved en­
tanglements such as the leasing of the naval bases at
Ewettenham, McNaughton. 1887-1939 (Toronto: The 
Ryerson Press, I968), I, 332.
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Halifax and Esquimalt to the Royal Navy. The gearing of 
industry for war had started in the late 1930's. (Bren 
gun contract, and some aircraft) Newspapers were becoming 
more ardent in their support of King, and were moralizing 
more freely about the need to help the democracies of Eur­
ope. At the same time, pacifistic sentiments declined 
among the clergy and university people, (a significant sign 
from a group of influential opinion-makers) Thus, according
to the latest indicators, there was little chance that the 
public would push for neutrality or non-involvement.
Taking these indicators as a reference base, the Cabinet 
met, before the Special Session to formulate government 
policy. On September 1, the War Measures Act was proclaimed, 
the Armed Forces were mobilized, and the Wartime Prices and 
Trade Board was established.^^ Policy was established early 
to justify these war preparations. On September 1, Vincent 
Massey in London received a telegram from the Department of 
External Affairs to keep the High Commissioner informed as 
to the Cabinet's decision. One exerpt from that telegram 
reads as follows:
"In the event of the United Kingdom becoming engaged 
in war in the effort to resist aggression, the govern­
ment of Canada have unanimously decided, as soon as 
Parliament meets, to seek its authority for effective 
cooperation by Canada at the side of Britain...The 
government has provided for the immediate issue of a 
proclamation under the War Measures Act in view of the 
existence of a state of apprehended war."?/
53Anderson, op. cit., pp. 130-3. 
^^Hardy, op. cit., p. 176.
^^King Papers, Vol. 27h, pp. 232136-7.
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The Prime Minister and his Cabinet decided that war 
could not be avoided, and set out immediately to win the 
acceptance of Parliament, summoned for September 7. In the 
meantime, active co-operation with Great Britain was main­
tained, and the Armed Forces were put on alert, with orders 
to support British defence measures in the Western Atlantic. 
On September 1, King stated that policy to the press:
"...all the necessary measures will be taken for the 
defence of Canada. Consultation with the United King­
dom will be continued. In the light of all the info­
rmation at its disposal, the Government will then re­
commend to Parliament the measures which it believes 
to be the most effective for co-operation and defence. 
That Parliament will sanction all necessary measures,
I have not the least doubt."
King further stated that the form and degree of part­
icipation by Canada in the war would be decided upon by 
Parliament.The omission of participation by Parliament 
in the deliberation stage is significant. This step by­
passed the Parliamentary role of criticism of basic govern­
ment policy, and the airing of public views, and made the 
Parliamentary process something of a formality. When Parl­
iament met, the emphasis of the government platform in the 
House was upon convincing the House that Canada should con­
tinue the process already established. The scope and method 
of participation was not really discussed in the Special 
Session, contrary to King's preceding statement.
The discussion in the House of Commons centered upon
56
Pickersgill, op. cit., p. l6.
57
Ibid.
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several Important themes. The first was a consideration 
of the initiatives carried out by Cabinet in the name of the 
Government prior to September 7. The Speech from the throne 
gave several indicators that set the tone for the Session. 
The Governor General's speech contained exerpts which indic­
ated that Canada was already at war, and Parliament would 
have to support this policy. One such statement reads as 
follows: "You will be asked to consider estimates for ex­
penditures which has been or may be caused by the state of 
war which now e x i s t s . I n  the same speech, however, the 
Governor General also showed that this decision was not auto­
matic, and Parliament would have to make the decision:
"You have been summoned at the earliest moment in 
order that the government may seek authority for the 
measures necessary for the defence of Canada, and for 
co-operation in the determined effort^which is being 
made to resist further aggression..."??
It is interesting that no other policy was presented 
in the Speech from the Throne in terms of alternatives to 
declaring war. In this respect. Parliament was presented 
with one policy to accept or r e j e c t . The crucial import­
ance of the Speech from the Throne was that it became the 
focal point of the whole Session, as King stated:
^^Canada, House of Commons, Debates, September 7, 1939,
p. 1.
59Ibid,
60Omitted from the Speech from the Throne:
"It is my hope that the desire for peace, which lies 
so close to the hearts of the peoples of all countries, will 
yet serve to avert international strife, and to restore 
among nations co-operation, understanding and goodwill."
King Papers, Vol. 276, p. 233^25.
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"If the address in reply to the Speech from the 
Throne is approved the government will therefore 
immediately take steps for the issue of a formal 
proclamation declaring the existence of a state of 
war between Canada and the German Reich.
The debate in the House of Commons on the Speech from
the Throne centered upon three major themes: The first of
these was an accentuation of the aggressive nature of
Germany as an expansionist power set upon world domination.
Again, this argument for participation was used by both
sides of the House. The Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Manion
stated at the culmination of a list of Nazi conquests:
"...Canada is the richest prize among the nations 
of the world. We should remember as well that this 
Canada of ours is very yunerable to attack in these 
ultra-scientific d a y s . " ° 2
King supported and reinforced this view by adding an 
extra dimension to this theory. King thought that Canada 
would be threatened indirectly, that is, if Great Britain 
were to be defeated by Germany.
"I noticed in the press last evening that one of 
the German papers which is supposed to be an organ of 
the administration had quoted Hitler as saying that if 
England wished to fight she must remember that if she 
entered this fight the prize of victory would.be the 
British Empire. Well, that includes Canada.
Whatever the validity of this potential menace, there 
was a perceived threat of direct German attack strongly 
believed by members on both sides of the House. The re­
action was to support Britain in stopping nazism before it
^^House of Commons, Debates, September 9, 1939, pp. 86-9. 
*^Ibid.. p. 15.
^^Ibid.. p. 22.
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AL
spread to Canada.
Another crucial series of arguments for participation 
centered upon the moral and democratic principles that were 
being submerged in Europe, and that Canada should fight to 
preserve these universal rights. Ernest Lapointe supplied 
King with a short series of points that he considered im­
portant reasons for going to war. To emphasize the moral 
aspect of this "crusade", Lapointe quoted President Roose­
velt at the opening of Congress, January 1939î
"There comes a time in the efforts of men when they 
must prepare to defend not their homes alone but the 
tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, 
their governments, and their very civilization are 
founded. The defence of religion, of democracy, and 
of good faith among nations is all the same fight.
To save one we must now make up our minds to save
all."65
It was important that this particular argument be 
stressed since Canada was under no treaty obligations to 
either Poland, France or Britain. To emphasize that these 
countries were the bulwark of democracy and must be supported 
to the maximum by Canada was a cardinal point in the 
Special Session of Parliament, as this exerpt from King's 
speech on September 8 indicates;
"Where is he creeping to? Into those communities 
of the north, some of which to-day say they are going 
to remain neutral. I tell them if they remain neutral 
in this struggle, and Britain and France go down, there 
is not one of them that will bear for long the name that 
it bears at the present time; not one of them."66
^S^ing, Canada and the War, op. cit., p. 7. 
66.
^^King Papers, Aug. 31, 1939, Vol. 270, p. 229106.
House of Commons, Debates, Sept. 8, 1939, p. 22.
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By this particular tine period, King had become a more 
bitter man. In 1937 he had trusted Hitler, but since that 
time Hitler had annexed the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslov­
akia, Danzig and now Poland. In reply to a note from Lord 
Riverdale, (Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission) who 
had passed on a letter from a German military official 
trying to justify the reclaiming of territory lost at Ver­
sailles, King indicated this change in attitude towards 
Nazi Germany and its leader;
"I thank you warmly for sending me a copy of the 
letter you received from Germany on the eve of war.
The subtle deceit of the whole Nazi regime surpasses,
I believe, anything of the kind in hi story."67
King's speech in the House included references to the 
mover (Mr. Hamilton of Ontario) the seconder (M. Blanchette 
of Quebec) and the third speaker (î'r. Manion) all of whom 
were war veterans, as representatives of the two great 
nations, Britain and France, who were once again fighting 
to defend freedom and democracy in the world. King contin­
ued with the reminder that the freedom, religion and con­
stitutional rights that they now enjoyed had been given to 
them by the Frenchmen and Britishers who had died for them.&G 
King continued with the statement that democracy, liberty 
and freedom must also be re-instated in Germany as well as 
the rest of Europe.
"That regime Nazism_7 has brought its own people 
under its iron heel. For the most part the people of 
Germany to-day are sieves, enslaved by a government.
6?King Papers, Vol. 277. pp. 234207-10.
House of Commons, Debates, Sept. 8, 1939, pp. 18-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
so-called, a dictator which holds a rifle at the 
head of every one of its citizens unless he is pre­
pared to do its bidding,"69
By the end of the Special Session, King was assured 
of almost unanimous support from the various political 
parties. At the same time, it was apparent that large 
groups of Canadians, in all probability a large proportion 
of French-Canadians were reluctant to go to war, and had 
accepted the decision only because of the promise of no con­
scription for overseas service, so eloquently presented 
by Lapointe in behalf of the Liberal government,70
It is difficult to ascertain precisely why the House 
of Commons, and particularly the Quebec members, did not 
more closely reflect the views of their constituents. Sev­
eral reasons immediately come to mind, the first being the 
highly emotional character of the House during the Special 
Session. The most vocal elements in the House were from 
the pro-war faction, which included the Cabinet leaders 
of the majority party, the Conservative Party, and the maj­
ority of the members of the minority parties. The House 
was also presented with a de facto fait accompli, as this 
statement by Ernest Lapointe indicates:
"There are certain measures of economic, naval and 
air co-operation which are obviously necessary and de­
sirable and which it is possible to undertake without 
delay...The information we have obtained indicates that 
the most immediate and effective further means of co­
operation would be a rapid expansion of air training, 
and of air and naval facilities, and the dispatch of 
trained air personnel."'I
69lbid.. p. 19.
7®Ward, op. cit., pp. 124-5.
^^House of Commons, Debates, Cept. 8, 1939, P. 64.
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The government no conscription pledge muted much of
the opposition from French Canada. Also the majority of
French-Canadian members maintained Party solidarity and only
a few actively attacked the government policy. One Liberal
H.P., M. Maxime Raymond tabled a Bill on September 8 with
a petition signed by "thousands of citizens against part-
72icipation by Canada in any extra-territorial war."' The 
amendment was defeated with less than five members supporting 
the motion. Another French-Canadian member, M. Lacombe, 
called for a plebisite of participation, extending the vote 
to include all men old enough to be conscripted, since the 
mandate of the Parliament had not been renewed since 1935.^3 
This motion was also rejected with an unrecorded vote.
The most articulate anti-war plea was delivered by 
the Leader of the C.C.F., J.8. Wbodsworth. Woodsworth's 
arguments not only reflected his own pacifistic philosophy, 
but also the feeling of many of the French-Canadian isol­
ationists. As Woodsworth stated to the House; "It is only 
a few months since we erected in Ottawa a memorial to the
poor fellows who fell in the last war; it is hardly fin-
74ished before we are into the next."'
Woodsworth was something of a North American isolation­
ist. He saw close ties with the United tat es and non­
involvement as a hemispheric problem, benefiting Canada 
more than involvement in imperialistic wars.
^^House of Commons, Debates, p. 6.
T^Ibid., p. 73.
^^Ibid.. p. 45.
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Maxine Raymond criticized the moral principles so 
glibly presented by government spokesmen, as well as the 
business establishments in London and Paris which had pro­
fiteered in the last war, and in all likelihood would do 
the same in the next:
"I learned that my sons were killed at the front 
with shells manufactured by countries at whose side I 
was fighting...I learned that, not later than last 
month, while rushing to conclude alliances in order 
to put a check on Germany, England and France were 
selling war materials to Germany."75
Raymond concluded by saying that Canada's duty was to 
stay aloof from foreign wars, and to defend the homeland 
if directly attacked.This argument, nevertheless was 
fairly effectively destroyed by Lapointe who spoke immediate­
ly afterwards. He emphasized events such as the sinlcing 
of the Athenia, and the pro-war mood of the public to 
show that Canada could not remain aloof, as the war had 
already come to this nation. Also, neutrality on the part 
of Canada would deprive the allies of strategic raw mater­
ials. In neutrality Canada would be aiding Germany and 
Nazism. If Britain were defeated, Canada would be threatened 
by German occupation of Newfoundland, Bermuda and the West 
Indies. Canada, under these conditions, had no choice 
but to declare w a r . 77
The outcome of the deliberations outlined above cul­
minated with an unrecorded vote, with only J.S. Woodsworth
^^Ibid.. p. 64. 
T^Ibid., p. 4.
77%bid.. pp. 66-8.
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rising to protest the decision. In the Senate there was 
unanimous approval. Parliament had decided that Canada 
could not stand aside from the Second World War, and the 
mechanics of declaring war were carried out. (Appendix E) 
National unity had been maintained, although it was 
rather artificial. King's promise of a moderate war effort, 
and no conscription for overseas service helped to estab­
lish this initial unity. Only a war of short duration 
could have justified King's position, since a moderate or 
limited effort was not synonymous with modern total war.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion
The consequences of the Special Session of Parliament 
and the decision to enter World War II, can be divided into 
two categories. The first of these was the effect upon the 
Internal political system of Canada, and included such 
problems as the challenges from Quebec and Ontario regard­
ing the Federal direction of the war, as well as the con­
troversy surrounding the two conscription crises of 1942 
and 1944.
The second section will include a short elaboration 
of Canada's contribution to the allied war effort, and an 
examination of the effects of the Canadian declaration of 
war upon Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relations in 
the war and early post-war periods.
The first test for the wartime government came from 
Quebec. In October 1939, Maurice Duplessis, the Premier 
of Quebec, called an election on the issue that the dec­
laration of war had been an infringement upon Provincial 
rights. He wanted a vote on the question of participation 
in the war, and on conscription. The Liberal government, 
Duplessis stated, was trying to deprive Quebec of her 
autonomy.^ King could not afford to ignore this challenge
^Hardy, op. cit., p. I83.
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to government policy, due to the fe&r of a break in the 
united front so narrowly maintained,
Lapointe, Power and Cardin took up the government 
side in the election, promising no conscription. These 
three Ministers threatened to resign if Quebec did not 
accept the Federal decision.
"...would it /"Quebec_7 support its ministers who 
had remained in the government and were taking an 
active part in the war effort, or would it condemn 
their actions and declare that the province was not 
going to participate in any way whatsoever in the war 
effort?"^
The main issue raised was conscription, with Duplessis 
arguing that participation in the war would Inevitably 
lead to conscription. (The 1st Canadian Division had already 
sailed for Britain) Lapointe, Power and Cardin made a 
pact that they would resign If conscription was introduced, 
and evidently this promise was enough to swing the Quebec 
voters overwhelmingly behind King and his government, as 
the results of the election show. ( Duplessis was reduced 
from 76 to 15 seats)^
After the hard-fought victory in Quebec, King was 
almost immediately threatened from another source. Mitchell 
Hepburn, the Liberal Premier of Ontario pushed through a 
vote of no-confidence in King, claiming that the war effort 
was half-hearted and Ineffectual, This threat from a Llb-
2
Ward, op. cit., p. 126.
3lbid.. pp. 128-30.
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eral Premier was used as a pretext to call an election for 
the Spring of 194-0. King was aware that his government's 
mandate had not been renewed since 1935, and he did not 
want to call an election in the midst of war. He called 
one in the "phoney war" period before the full force of 
war could be brought to bear on Canada, since by 1940 it 
was seen that the struggle would be of long duration, so 
that he could have a clear mandate for the duration.^ King 
was once again successful, and the Liberal government was 
returned with the largest majority in the history of Can­
ada. (Liberals; 1?8 seats, Conservatives; 39)^
However, the major challenges to King's wartime gov­
ernment revolved around conscription. In 1939, King pro­
mised no conscription for overseas service. The government 
policy, however, became less clear as the war progressed.
In June 1940, an act (National Resources Mobilization Act) 
was passed calling up men for home defence duties. The 
first major crisis, however, did not arise until 1942, 
when a decision was thrust upon the government by the dec­
laration of war against Japan. British Columbia was now 
directly threatened, and Canadian troops were defeated by 
Japan at Hong Kong. The government, at this point, con­
sidered the nation threatened to the point that conscrip­
tion might be necessary, and a plebisite was held to feel 
out public opinion. It was found that 2,945,514 Canadians
Slardy, op. cit., pp. 184-7. 
5
Roberts, op. cit., p. 79.
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approved of conscription, while 1,64-3,006 were against 
such a policy.^ The Cabinet became seriously divided over 
the conscription crisis, with Cardin resigning over the 
government bill to amend the National Service Act to allow 
conscription for overseas service. (Bill 80) King was no 
longer so adamant on his non-conscription pledge, as this 
1942 statement indicates; "not necessarily conscription, 
but conscription if necessary." He was moving more and more 
towards conscription for overseas service. First, conscr­
iption was introduced for home defence, (1940), secondly, 
the home defence sphere was enlarged to include the whole 
Western Hemisphere, and third, conscription was introduced 
for overseas service, if necessary. (1942)7 in 1944, 16,908 
conscripts were sent overseas, due to a manpower shortage 
in Europe, of which 2,400 reached the front lines.^ This 
was perhaps the hardest barrier King had to overcome in all 
his years in office.
The crisis once more saw King's Cabinet divided, with 
O.P. Power resigning his post. King weathered this threat 
and the reaction from Quebec, with the help of Louis £t. 
Laurent. King's success in both these crises had to be due 
to the slow progressive steps taken towards conscription 
rather than a duplication of the policy followed In 1917
^Stacey, op. cit., pp. 397-401.
^D.J. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada 1867-1967 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Ï967) , p. 122.
^M. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army 
1939-45 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin ^ Co., 1956), pp. 5-6.
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when conscription was suddenly thrust upon Quebec. That 
conscription was introduced so smoothly in the Second World 
War is a tribute to King and the French Canadian members 
of his Cabinet.
One assertion made earlier (Chapter 5) was that the 
delay in Canada's declaration of war was engineered to assert 
Canadian sovereignty and ability to make independent decis­
ions. The declarations of war against both Italy and Japan 
differed fundamentally from this earlier one against Ger­
many. The guiding principle in the German declaration was 
that "Parliament would decide", but both of these declarat­
ions (as well as the declarations against Rumania, Hungary 
and Finland) were decided upon without consulting Parlia­
ment.9 The government simply issued an order-in-council to 
the effect that a state of war now existed.
One additional point was that in both cases Canada's 
declaration came before the major nations involved declared 
war. In the Italian case, Canada declared war commencing 
June 10,1940. Prance and Britain were not at war until 
12:01 a.m. June 11. The declaration of war against Japan 
was also concluded before the United States' declaration. 
(December 7, 1941) In both cases, the official reason 
stated was that legal protection was provided to any member 
of the Armed Forces who might have been involved with It­
alian or Japanese forces. In the Italian case, a Canadian 
naval vessel fired on an Italian ship on June 10, after
^Hutchinson, Hr. Prime Minister, op. cit., p. 269»
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receiving word that war had been declared, and the declar­
ation was updated to validate the seizure. In the Japanese 
case, there was a fear of raids similar to the Pearl Harbour 
type along the West Coast of Canada. To avoid inhibiting 
the military on the West coast, a declaration was announced, 
and armed forces personnel that might have become involved 
with the Japanese were protected.^^However, if this was true 
in the case of these two decisions, was not the risk of 
clashes between German and Canadian forces even greater in 
the week of neutrality? If the above argument holds, Ca­
nada should have updated the decision to September 3, 1939.
It is more probable that the German declaration was 
used to assert Canadian independence, and there was no need 
to do the same in the case of Italy and Japan, Expediency, 
in the latter, overruled international political consid­
erations.
The most direct result of the declaration of war against 
Germany was Canada's contribution to the war effort against 
the Axis powers. Canada began the war with 9,4-00 men in 
the Armed Forces, 11 ships in the Navy, almost no modern 
combat aircraft, and no tanks or armoured vehicles. Such 
a forces could hardly have Impressed or deterred any po­
tential aggressor in 1939* However, such was the expansion 
rate of the Armed Forces and defence industry, that by 1945
^^Read, op. cit., pp. 392-3.
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Canada was considered the world's fourth rated power.^^Thls 
remarkable change should be looked at in some detail.
Perhaps the greatest project carried out in Canada 
during the war was the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. From 
its beginning in the spring of 1940, to the end of 1945, the 
plan produced 131,553 fliers and 106,000 ground crew. The
plan was deemed, "one of the greatest factors in the victory
of the democratic p o w e r s . "12 About half of the personnel 
trained were Canadian, another one-third British, and the 
remainder Australian, New Zealanders, Poles, Czechs, Dutch, 
Norwegian, Belgian and French.
The contribution of the R.C.A.F. was substantial. By
1945 the R.C.A.F. had become the fourth largest Allied Air
Force, with fourty coastal patrol squadrons and fourty-eight 
fighter and bomber squadrons, of which the No. 6 Group,
Bomber Command was sending 200 bombers a night to attack 
Germany. R.C.A.F, squadrons served in North Africa (fighter) 
in Burma (transport) and in Ceylon (Patrol) as well as from 
Britain, Newfoundland and Canada.(Patrol) Canadians also 
served in the R.A.F. By 1945 there were over 6,000 Canadian 
radar mechanics in the R.A.F. In fact, there were more Can­
adians in the R.A.F. than in the R.C.A.F. by the end of the
war.13
The navy performed a far less glamourous but equally
R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Sit­
uation", International Journal Vol. XVIII (Summer, 1962), 
pp. 203-4.
^^L.F. Hannon, Canada at war (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, I968), p. 9^1
^^Goodspeed, op. cit., pp. 173-(' /  '
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Important role throughout the war. The Navy started the war 
with 11 ships, but in 19^5 deployed 4?1 ships ranging from 
aircraft carriers and cruisers to Mtb's and landing craft. 
Canadian ships sank 29 axis submarines, with the loss of 
1,990 men. The Navy assumed command of all convoy escorts 
in the North West Atlantic, for most of the war, with Can­
adian ships operating in the English Channel, the Caribbean, 
the Mediterranean, the North Sea, (to Murmansk) and a 
cruiser in the Indian Ocean, as well as one in the Pacific.
As in the case of the R.C.A.F., large numbers of Canadians 
serving in the Royal Navy, in all types of ships, and in all 
theatres of the war.
The contribution of the Canadian Army to the war effort 
in the early stages of the war was somewhat passive but nec­
essary. the 1st Division, in the early part of the Battle 
of Britain was the only fully equipped division in Great 
Britain. "In these circumstances the 1st Canadian division 
achieved an importance undreamed of two months previously... 
the division was 'the strongest element in a very weak
fabric."15
The division was reinforced in December 19^0 by the 2nd 
Division, and a Canadian Corps was formed. The Army played 
DO active role in Europe until the Dieppe Raid (66^ casualties) 
vindicating King's cautious attitude towards the deployment 
of Canadian troops:
1 If
G.A. Milne, H.M.C.B. (Toronto: Thomas Allen Ltd.,
i960), pp. l4-7.
15Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 115.
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"A feeling of not committing Canada to severe cas­
ualties pervaded defence thinking until well into the 
war when public opinion pressed for Canadian troops 
to be used in a 'useful' capacity instead of merely 
protecting Britain from a not-to-certain German threat 
of invasion.
With the loss of 2,000 Canadian troops to the Japanese 
at Hong Kong and the Dieppe disaster, Canada needed a vic­
tory, or at least a successful campaign, for morale purposes. 
This opened the way for the Canadian 1st Division and the 
1st Tank Brigade to be sent to Italy. The tremendous cas­
ualties of this campaign, especially the Battle for Ortona, 
led to the manpower shortage which caused the conscription 
crisis of 1944.
Canadians served with distinction in the Normandy in­
vasion, contributing the 3rd Division, 2nd Armoured Brigade 
and the 1st Paratroop Battalion to the D Day landings. The 
1st Canadian Army (the first formation of its kind completely 
under the command of Canadian officers) liberated the Nether­
lands, Northern Belgium, and the Channel coast of France.
Small Commando, Naval Commando and intelligence units 
were formed, and French-Canadian wireless operators worked 
with the Maquis in France and Belgium. The Canadian Army
by the end of 1945 had reached the strength of 730,625 
17men and women.
Canada, in relation to the strategic direction of the 
war, played a minor role. Military direction was the sole
^^T. Robertson, The Shame and the Glory (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, I967), p. 17.
17
Hannon, op. cit., p. 112.
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perogatlve of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (British and Am­
erican) and Canada was not granted anything more than an 
occasional observer, with strategic directions relayed to 
the Canadian Chiefs-of-staff by their British counterparts.^^
The Quebec conferences of 194-3 (Quadrant) and 1944 
(Octagon) were the most likely to include Canadian part­
icipation in strategic direction. "Even in these cases Can­
ada was not formally a party to the meeting except as host."19 
Churchill and Roosevelt feared Canadian participation would 
bring similar demands from other allies and members of the 
United Nations. Much the same problem occurred throughout 
the war with Canada largely excluded from decisions that af­
fected the deployment of Canadian forces. "His ,/^ing ' s_y 
attitude...was that the situation was unsatisfactory, but 
there did not seem to be any useful initiative that Canada 
could take."20 King was angered by this tendency to by-pass 
Canada, but did not communicate this to Churchill or Roose­
velt.
Although Canadian relations with Britain and the United 
States were not close at the strategic level, at the tactical 
level a close co-operation was maintained. Ties with Brit­
ain had been close and cordial since the formation of Can­
adian fighting units. The continuation of euch a policy
^^Stacey, op. cit., p. 159. 
^^Ibid.. p. 1Ü1.
2°Ibid.. p. 186.
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was completely natural. The same bonds were not to be 
found in Canadian-American relations in 1939, but geograph­
ical propinquity, and common defence problems inevitably 
led to closer co-operation as the war progressed.
The initial formal recognition of a need for joint de­
fence of the North American continent came in August 194-0, 
when the Ogdensburg Agreement set up a Permanent Joint Board 
on Defence. The first item of joint interest was the defence 
of Newfoundland, which Canada had assumed in early 1940. In 
September of that year, Britain leased several bases in New­
foundland to the United States, and both Canada and the 
United States co-operated closely in defence of the island. 
Joint action in this sphere was extended to convoy protection 
and anti-submarine patrols by the forces of both nations.
The North Atlantic Air Ferry system produced a need for 
close co-operation in the routing of aircraft from the United 
States through Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland 
to Britain.
On the western coast of North America, concerted eff­
orts began after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The initial 
projects of concern were routes across Canada between Al­
aska and the United States proper. The Alaska highway, the 
sea route from Anchorage to Prince Rupert, and the air 
staging route were established in 1942. This air route 
was later used to ferry lend-lease aircraft to the Soviet
^^Ibid.. pp. 357-77.
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Union from the United States, through Canada, Alaska and 
Siberia to Western Russia. Concerted efforts were also 
extended to the "canot" project to ship oil from the Mac­
kenzie River by pipeline to Alaska.
The United States, through the Ogdensburg Agreement, 
supplied coastal defence guns for the protection of British 
Columbia, and early in 194-2, six squadrons of Canadian 
fighters, a bomber squadron and anti-aircraft crews joined 
the air defence network of A l a s k a . 22 Two additional squadrons 
were also assigned to the Aleutian campaign as well as three 
armoured merchant cruisers and two corvettes for convoy 
protection. In addition, 5,300 Canadian troops took part 
in the expedition to Kiska.^^
One unique Canadian-America experiment was the joint- 
nation 1st Special Service Regiment, a unit of high combat 
efficiency and courage which distinguished itself in Anzio 
as well as the main allied campaign in I t a l y . 24
Canada and the United States sychronized efforts in the 
protection of locks and waterways between the two countries.
A few Canadian troops were trained and stationed in the
\
United States, and somewhat more American servicemen in Can­
ada. On the whole, these arrangements were quite amicable.
Canadian troops, except in rare Instances, did not 
fight under American command, and military relations, thus
22lbid., pp. 377-90.
23
Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 162.
24
Hannon, op. cit., p. 112.
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producing little friction. The sane cannot be said of 
relations between Canada and Great Britain, where Canadian 
forces overseas tended to be under British command. Almost 
from the first, the British discouraged separate Canadian 
commands, preferring to Keep Canadian units as sub-sections 
of British commands. Even the top Canadian field commanders 
were directly under British control. When the 1st Overseas 
Canadian Army was formed in the spring of 1944, the overall 
direction and command responsibility was under British dir­
ection, as this incident at a meeting between King and 
Field Marshal Montgomery relates:
"Montgomery's purpose in meeting King was to tell 
him why the British High Command had insisted on the 
removal of General A.G.L. McNaughton as commander of 
the overseas Canadian Army some months earlier and to 
warn the Prime Minister that McNaughton's successor, 
General H.D.G. Crerar, would be removed too, if he 
failed in the European Invasion."25
One major premise of Terence Robertson's book on Dieppe 
was that the operation was conceived and directed by Mont­
gomery of the Army and Mountbatten of Combined Operations, 
with the Canadian 2nd Division commander, Hamilton Roberts 
being ignored in the planning, and given his instructions 
to carry out with no recourse to change or modification. 
However, it was Roberts who was blamed for the failures 
in the operation.
The British also discouraged the formation of separate 
R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. They favoured a system of joint
^^Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 273» 
^^Robertson, op. cit.. Part I.
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commonwealth squadrons as part of the R.A.F. The British 
claim was that morale and combat efficiency improved with 
the friendly inter-nation rivalry that developed.^7 The 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan concept, it was felt, quite 
naturally led to a combined Commonwealth Air Force (under 
British control) rather than small separate air corps. The 
Canadian government did not approve of this system by which 
they would retain little control over their air crews once 
they went overseas.
Part of the problem stemmed from the different attitude 
towards relations with Britain from the political sphere 
and the military in Canada. Mackenzie King had fought to 
build and maintain Canadian sovereignty, and his policy during 
the war did not differ from this. However, the military 
leaders at all levels were strong Anglophones, and saw mil­
itary co-operation with Britain as an absolute necessity, 
and British control over Canadian forces as quite natural.
For example, there was no question, among the military on 
both sides of the ocean, that Canada would provide an ex­
peditionary force for Europe, and planning had begun in the
28middle thirties. King could not expect much help from the 
military in his moves to sustain Canadian independence.
In terras of Canadian sovereignty, the overall effect 
of World War II and the Canadian declaration of war is
27Stacey, in Careless and Brown, op. cit., p. 286.
28Swettenhara, op. cit. , pp. 301-2.
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somewhat unclear. However, some concrete results can be 
discerned. The war drew the United States and Canada closer 
together in terms of defence and military co-operation, a 
bond that increased in the post-war years with the NORAD and 
NATO alliances, as well as closer co-operation in the ex­
change of military equipment, information and technical ad­
vances. The traditional military link between Canada and 
Britain, in many ways, was lost with the increased usage of 
American equipment in the Canadian Armed Forces.
In respect to Great Britain, Canadian independence 
and sovereignty of action was exerted by the separate dec­
laration of war, setting a precedent for independent Canad­
ian action in international affairs from that time forward. 
This was especially accentuated by the "week of neutrality" 
and the international recognition of that status. It would 
be rather trite to say that Canada became a nation on Sept­
ember 10, 1939, but that date was perhaps the last signif­
icant step in the continuing process of asserting Canada's 
independence from Great Britain.
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Appendix B t
A Functional Diagram of Information Flow in Foreign Policy 
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Appendix G :
Office of the President
of the Prussian Cabinet Council, Berlin, Apr. 8, I938
To His Excellency MacKenzie King,
Prime Minister,
Ottawa.
Your excellency,
...Your excellency is no doubt aware of the intention 
of a German syndicate to acquire certain forest resources 
in Anticosti from the Consolidated Paper Company for 
developmental purposes...
Because of certain questions that have been brought 
up in Parliament, I want to assure Your Excellency that 
this proposition is of a purely economic character and that 
the only purpose of the syndicate is the production of 
lumber. Any rumors about interference with sovereign 
rights and prerogatives or with military works rests 
on fancy...
With the assurance of my highest esteem,
I am Your Excellency's devoted
(sqd) Goring.
W.L.M.King Papers, "Statements and Speeches", Vol 250, p. 213702
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Appendix D ;
Ontario Conservative Party Leader Colonel G.A. Drew 
mentioned his intention to "attack in these speeches 
Nazi barbarism with the utmost vigour".
In Protest:
E. Windels (German Consul General) to Dr. O.D. Skelton 
January 14, 1939.
"Given Colonel Drew's official position in the pol­
itical life of Canada, on the one hand, and the government 
controlled set-up of radio broadcasting in Canada, on the 
other hand, I feel sure that ray government could not but 
interpret the projected radio attacks in a light which 
would cast shadows in the good understandings between 
our two governments."
The Canadian reply was to reiterate that freedom of 
speech was enjoyed by everyone in Canada, as it should 
be everywhere,
W.L.M. King Papers, "Statements and Speeches", Vol 282,
p. 238483
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Appendix E;
Speech by Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice:
"We are bound by contract with Britain to give Britain 
the full use of the dry docks at Halifax and Esqulrnalt 
for British vessels...Of course we could put an end to 
the contract. Would Canadians be willing to do that? And 
if we did not, during a war in which we claimed neutrality, 
British vessels and British soldiers would come to Halifax 
or Esquimau and it would be the duty of the Canadians there 
to prevent their coming and intern them if they came. Even 
if some people in some parts of Canada would like to do 
that, do you think the citizens of Halifax and Esqulrnalt 
would fight against British sailors and intern British 
vessels."
Canada, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), Vol II (31 March, 1939) p. 2467
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Appendix F ;
A Petition for W.L.M. King from the Legislative Assembly 
of Ontario, March 23, 1939
"And that this Legislative Assembly of Ontario 
hereby petitions the Federal Parliament of Canada now 
in session to immediately pass legislation providing 
that in the event of a war emergency the wealth and man­
power of Canada shall be mobilized by proclamation of the 
Governor-in-Council, for the duration of the war, in 
defence of our free institutions."
W.L.M. King Papers, "Ltatements and Speeches", Vol. 271, 
p. 229285
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Appendix G ;
Statements by French-Canadian Newspapers (August to fepten-
ber 11, 1939)
Le Droit (Ottawa)
August 24: "Like the late Sir Robert Borden in 1914,
Mr. King in 1939 pursues the policy of the military 
solidarity of the Empire. Our external policy is 
determined in London. We could not have a finer 
example of this than what is now taking place."
September 2: "if Canada at this moment is placed on a
war footing it is not in virtue of alliances or 
precise obligations but simply because the present 
government, in spite of the Statute of Westminister,
holds that Canada is at war when England is at war."
Le Devoir (Montreal)
September 4: "Mr. King in making these declarations
is obstinately set upon binding Parliament in advance, 
presenting it with a fall accompli...He/ King_/ 
turns over to the London Government the task of 
deciding for us...Discontent, instinctive opposition 
are so marked, so profound, that demonstrations are 
being organized already."
Le Droit (Ottawa)
September 5: "Mr. King and his Cabinet have rejected
the principle of neutrality, and it is hardly pro­
bable that Parliament would have adopted this
principle, though it is the only logical one."
"French Canadian Press and the War," Memorandum to W.L.M. 
King, King Papers, "Statements and Speeches" Vol. 2/0,
pp. 229117-21
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Appendix H ;
Reactions to the Foreign Policy Statements of May, 1939.
"The Prime Minister recie/ed unexpected commendation 
from the Montreal Gazette, which declared that he had 
defined Canada's position in a manner calculated to please 
patriotic Canadians, but another Conservative newspaper, 
the Ottawa Journal, sarcastically asserted that the same 
sort of pronouncement as Mr. King and Dr. Manion had made 
might have come from the leaders of some non-British dem­
ocracy like Sweden. They had offered, declared the Journal, 
no evidence of the realisation of Canada's responsibilities 
as a partner in the British Commonwealth. The Toronto 
Globe and Mail (independent Liberal) while it found in 
Mr. MacKenzie King's speech some encouraging acknowledgement 
of Canada's obligations, regretting that he had not promised 
in decisive language the wholehearted co-operation that 
Mr. Chamberlain obviously desired from all of the nations 
of the Commonwealth,..In the French-Canadian press the 
comments were severely critical, and they reflected an 
uneasiness that soon found overt expression in Quebec,"
"Canada and the War Danger," Round Table, Vol. 29, June,
1939, pp. 574-5.
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Appendix I ;
W.J. Lindal (Manitoba Liberal Association) to W.L.M. King, 
July 8, 1939.
"Your duties as Prime Minister and Minister of 
External Affairs are too arduous. Because of the serious 
international situation, tne work in the External Depart­
ment should be extended rather than curtailed, and in 
making that statement I am not criticizing the excellent 
work which has been done in the past. It occurred to 
me that prior to the next election you might put in 
practice an idea you had in mind a few years ago and 
appoint an Under-Secretary of External Affairs,"
King emphatically rejected this appeal. It was not until 
1947 that King allowed Louis St. Laurent to become the 
first Minister of External Affairs.
W.L.M. King Papers, "Statements and Speeches", Vol 271,
p. 229340
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Appendix J ;
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
of the
RIGHT HON. WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE KING 
(September 7, 1939)
Prime Minister, President of the 
Privy Council, Secretary of State
for External Affairs.................Rt. Hon. W.L.M. King
Member of the Administration and
Minister without Portfolio...........Hon. Raoul Dandurand
Minister of Mines and Resources..... Hon. T.A. Crerar
Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Canada....................Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe
Minister of Public Works............ Hon. P.J.A. Cardin
Minister of Trade and Commerce...... Hon. W.D. Euler
Minister of Finance.................. Hon. J.L. Ralston
Postmaster General...................Hon. N.A. McLarty
Secretary of State...................Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe
Minister of National Defence........ Hon. I.A. MacKenzie
Minister of Pensions and National
Health............................... Hon. C.G. Power
Minister of National Revenue.........Hon. J.L. Ilsley
Minister of Fisheries................ Hon. J.E. Michaud
Minister of Lebour................... Hon. N.M. Rogers
Minister of Transport.... .......Hon. C.D. Howe
Minister of Agriculture.............. Hon. J.G. Gardiner
Minister without Portfolio...........Hon. J.A, MacKinnon
Canada, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), Special War Session, 1939, p. H i
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Appendix K ;
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OTTAWA CANADA
TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN LONDON
MOST IMMEDIATE Ottawa, September 9th, 1939#
SECRET 
CYPHER 
No. 306
Secret. No. 306. It is requested that the 
following submission be made to His Majesty the King, 
Begins:
The Prime Minister of Canada presents his humble 
duty to His Majesty the King.
It is expedient that a Proclamation should be 
issued in the name of His Majesty, in Canada, declaring 
that a state of war with the German Reich has existed 
in Canada as and from September (date to be inserted 
later). [_ 10th September, 1939_Z
The Prime Minister of Canada, accordingly, 
humbly submits to His Majesty the petition of the King's 
Privy Council for Canada that His Majesty may approve 
the issuing of such a Proclamation in His name.
The Prime Minister of Canada remains His Majesty's
most faithful and obedient servant.
W.L. MacKenzie King 
Prime Minister of Canada.
Ottawa, September (date to be inserted later), 1939.
End s.
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Appendix K ; (continued)
It is requested that you present the above sub­
mission in writing immediately to the King, Informing 
His Majesty that upon approval by Parliament of the 
address to His Excellency a short telegram in clear will 
be sent, asking you to complete the submission. You 
will inform the King that His Majesty's Government in 
Canada desires that His Majesty's approval be communicated 
immediately by telegram, either directly or through you, 
for publication in Canada by Proclamation in His Majesty's 
name in the Canada Gazette. Formal submission in 
writing will follow.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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Appendix K ;(Continued) TELEGRAM
From T h e  H IG H  C O M M IS S IO N E R  FOR CANADA IN G R E A T  B R IT A IN  
To T H E  SECRETARY OF S TA TE  FOR E X T E R N A L  A FFA IR S , CANADA
h /
■/ :. I
MOOT IMIvEDIATE
CYPHER
Ho.567
LO NDON, 10th September, 1959.
No.367. Following for Prime Minister, 
Begins:
Your telegrams Hos.301 and 306, and 
unnumbered of the 9th September. Have just 
returned from Royal Lodge - Windsor, where 
His Majesty The King received me and gave 
Üis approval to your submission at 1*08 p.m.
VINCENT MASSEY
Reo*d Ottawa, 10,45 a.m.
D.S.T. 10th S e p t .  1939.
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